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Although the Florida debacle during the 2000 Presidential election,
which nearly precipitated a constitutional crisis, happened over six years
ago, its reverberations continue to be felt. Since that time there has been an
explosion of research and literature on voting. In particular, researchers
have focused intense scrutiny on voting technology and Internet voting.
While election administrators hailed new voting technology as a savior for
error prone, old voting machinery, and many looked on Internet voting as
the future; it soon appeared that it raised serious new issues.
This bibliography consists of annotated references to books, reports,
periodical articles, and cases examining the brave new world of electronic
voting machines and Internet voting. This bibliography limits itself to post2000 material. It does not include newspaper articles, popular magazines,
or materials unobtainable from either the Internet or major research
libraries. Due to the substantial body of literature on this subject, the
bibliography is not comprehensive. Omissions do not necessarily reflect a
qualitative judgment about the material omitted.

*
J.D., Northern Illinois University; M.S., University of Illinois. Associate
Professor and Research & Instructional Services Librarian, Northern Illinois University
College of Law Library.
**
J.D., The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; M.L.S. Dominican
University; Associate Professor and Reference and Instructional Services Librarian at the
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BOOKS, REPORTS, AND STUDIES

R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, CALTECH/MIT VOTING
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPING

PROJECT,
THE NEXT BIG ELECTION CHALLENGE:
ELECTRONIC
DATA TRANSACTION STANDARDS FOR

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (July 2005),

http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/AlvarezReport.pdf.
The authors of this report highlight the need for electronic transaction
standards (ETS) for election systems. They begin by looking at the current
state of standards in election administration. While voluntary standards
regarding voting machines exist, there are no standards for electronic data
exchange. The lack of standards on data exchange has led to limited
competition and proprietary systems that do not talk to systems from a
different vendor. The authors then examine, but make no endorsement of,
two current attempts to develop ETS by The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) and the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The authors look at three
specific areas of election systems that the lack of ETS affects and then
conclude with recommendations on the roles the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), and Congress should take regarding ETS.
R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK, AND VOTE:
THE FUTURE OF INTERNET VOTING (2004).

With the ubiquitous presence of the Internet in every day life, increasing attention has been paid to using the Internet for voting. In the first
chapter, the authors of this book provide an overview of the issues
surrounding Internet voting and their position on Internet voting. In the
second chapter, the authors examine studies and critiques of Internet voting.
Unlike the recommendations in those studies, they believe Internet voting
should be implemented now in a controlled, limited manner among certain
classes of voters where it is needed. They think that demand will inspire
the development of technology for Internet voting rather than advances in
technology allowing Internet voting to be gradually phased-in. The third
chapter looks at how Internet voting could eliminate problems with
transparency, voter error, uniformity, and access; but the authors acknowledge that the issue of the digital divide would have to be addressed first.
Chapter four discusses Internet voting within the larger framework of the
use of the Internet in our current political process. The authors argue in
favor of using Internet voting for an iterative, deliberative democracy rather
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than a direct online democracy. Chapter five explores the issue of security
and Internet voting. The authors find that risks inherent in Internet voting
are not that different from risks inherent in the current electronic voting
machines. They assert that risk mitigation methods exist and that market
forces and government intervention will lead to improvements in online
security. The sixth chapter identifies voting methods in current use that can
be analogized to Internet voting, such as voting by mail, absentee voting,
and early voting. The seventh chapter analyzes recent tests of Internet
voting and the conclusions that can be drawn from these attempts. Finally,
chapter eight discusses reforms needed to make Internet voting viable.
R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ ET AL., CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY
PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS, WHAT COULD BE (2001),

http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/julyOl/JulyO lVTPVoting
_ReportEntire.pdf.
After the 2000 presidential election, the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology launched the Project
on Voting Technology. In this report, they first examine what went wrong.
Regarding voting equipment, they find that two percent of the ballots in the
presidential election were not counted and five percent of the ballots did not
register a Senate or gubernatorial vote. This residual vote varied depending
on the voting equipment used. In Part II of the report, they look at current
voting technology and identify its strengths and weaknesses. They find that
precinct optical scanning machines had fewer residual votes (undervotes
and overvotes not counted). They speculate that older direct recording
electronic devices (DREs) may have higher residual vote rates due to
confusion with the interfaces and see great potential in the newer DREs. In
addition to lost votes, they discuss the cost, accountability, management,
accessibility, and security of the different voting technologies. In Part III of
the report, they look at the future of voting technology. They propose a
framework for developing future voting equipment, focusing on separating
out the processes of recording a vote from casting the vote. Their framework also envisions standard voting machine specifications, open source
software for vote casting, digital signatures, and cryptography. They
recommend the establishment of a national program to encourage development of better voting systems and a program for field-testing all voting
equipment. They believe the federal government should implement a
standards commission and develop a clearinghouse of information on
voting systems.
R. Michael Alvarez, Counting Ballots and the 2000 Election:
What Went Wrong?, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 34-50 (Ann N. Crigler et al.
eds., 2004).
In this chapter of Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of
American Election Reform, the authors look at the 2000 election and then
specifically analyze the election administration in California during the
2000 election. They begin with the results of the Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project's report on the 2000 election that found that punch-card
machines and direct recording electronic devices (DREs) had the highest
residual vote rates. They then move on to examining California's uncounted ballots. More counties in California used punch-card machines
than in the United States as a whole. California counties using punch-card
systems had higher residual vote rates than optical scanning or DRE touch
screen systems. Precinct-count optical scanning devices performed better
than central-count optical scanning devices. California counties using
punch-card systems had greater non-white populations. California counties
using precinct-count optical scanning devices had greater non-white
populations than those using central-count optical scanning devices. The
authors speculate that the data may implicate equal protection violations or
violations of the Voting Rights Act.
STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE ET AL., CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY

PROJECT,
RESIDUAL
VOTES
ATTRIBUTABLE
TO TECHNOLOGY:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELIABILITY OF EXISTING VOTING EQUIPMENT
(vers. 2 March 20, 2001),
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/-voting/CalTech-MIT_Report-Version2.pdf.
This report looks at the relationship between changing voting technologies and residual votes over time. The authors examine election data
over the 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections. They find that
manually counted paper ballots had the lowest residual vote count, followed
by lever machines and optical scanners. Punch-card systems and direct
recording electronic devices (DREs) had higher rates of residual votes.
They acknowledge that other factors such as literacy rates, education levels,
election administration funding, and county populations might explain the
higher residual vote rate. They speculate that DREs had higher residual
vote rates because there may be problems with interface design, there may
be a technology curve, and there may be a voter learning curve. In additon,
DREs may need more administrative attention because they may be harder
to maintain, less reliable, and less user-friendly. The authors state that
future improvements to electronic voting machines may lead to improvements in the rate of ballots counted.
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BENJAMIN B. BEDERSON & PAUL S. HERRNSON, USABILITY REVIEW OF
THE DIEBOLD DRE SYSTEM FOR FOUR COUNTIES IN THE STATE OF
MARYLAND (2002), http://www.cs.umd.edu/-bederson/voting/umd-dre-

report.pdf.
This report provides the results of testing of Diebold machines in a
small area of Maryland. The testing of the machines was done in three
different ways: (1) expert review, (2) close-up observation, and (3) fieldtesting. The expert review involved five faculty and staff members of the
Human-Computer Interaction Laboratory at the University of Maryland.
Each member reported on his or her individual use of the machines. The
close-up observation testing involved watching individuals use the
machines. The individuals were asked to talk through the process so that
researchers could better understand what a user thought and saw with
respect to the machines. The third method, field-testing, is used to get a
better cross-section of society. In this instance however, the voters
involved tended to be from higher socio-economic areas that did not have a
significant minority or non-English speaking group. The researchers found
both strengths and weaknesses in the study. Strengths were connected to
general ease of use. Weaknesses involved directions for use, interface, and
to some extent, reliability (one machine used failed early in the process).
HENRY E. BRADY ET AL., COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE
OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 2001),

http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/new-web/countingallthevotes.pdf.
This study compares the residual vote rate from the 2000 presidential
election of the five different voting systems: direct recording electronic
devices (DREs), optical scanning machines, paper ballots, lever machines,
and punch-card machines. The authors find that DRE, lever, optical
scanning, and paper ballots all had lower residual vote rates than punchcard machines. They find that optical scanning machines and DREs
perform best but that DREs have a poorer performance in smaller counties
and optical scanning devices seem slightly more prone to performance
problems. In contradiction to the Caltech/M1T study, Voting: What It Is,
What It Could Be, the authors do not find evidence that DREs are more
difficult for poorly educated voters to use. Because of limitations on the
data available to researchers, and because of county-specific characteristics,
the authors assert that it is premature to make conclusions regarding the
performance of DREs, optical scanning machines, lever machines, and
paper ballots. They recommend moving away from punch-card systems to
DREs or optical scanning devices; implementing uniform reporting
standards on residual votes, voter education, and election administration
resources in each county and precinct; more research into usability studies
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to discover which features in voting machines cause the residual votes; and
more study on voting systems and their individual features.
THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY:
VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY, USABILITY, AND COST

(2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/downloadfile38150.pdf.
This report is designed to help election officials balance factors of
security, accessibility, usability, and cost when deciding which voting
technologies to purchase. The report evaluates six voting system types: (1)
direct recoding electronic devices (DREs), (2) DREs with voter-verifiable
paper trails (DREs with VVPT), (3) precinct-count optical scan systems
(PCOS), (4) ballot marking devices (BMD), (5) vote-by-mail systems, and
(6) vote-by-phone systems. In the chapter on security, the report ultimately
finds that DREs, DREs with VVPT, and PCOS all have serious security
vulnerabilities that can be reduced by relatively easy and inexpensive
remedial measures, which the report lists, but that few jurisdictions have
thus far applied these measures. In the chapter on accessibility, the report
provides a series of questions that election officials should pose when
evaluating voting systems and sets out a general assessment of the
advantages and limitations the different voting technologies offer in regard
to these questions. In the chapter on usability, the report reviews current
research on usability, compiles a set of usability principles that should be
invoked when evaluating voting systems, and makes recommendations
regarding ballot design and system instructions. In the final chapter, which
discusses cost, the report looks at five voting systems and reports general
and jurisdiction-dependent factors that contribute to a voting system's long
and short-term cost.
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE'S AD HOC TOUCH SCREEN TASK
FORCE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE (July 1, 2003),

http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce-report-entire.pdf.
In response to controversy over direct recording electronic devices
(DREs), the California Secretary of State created the Ad Hoc Touch Screen
Task Force. The Task Force identified four issues: security issues
surrounding DREs, administrative security issues regarding tests and
processes, voter confidence, and the usefulness and necessity of voter
verification. The Task Force also looked at federal and state laws regarding
accessibility and language requirements; the time frame in which any
recommendations must be implemented in order to be ready for the 2004
election; inconvenience to the voters; the complexity of election administra-
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tion; printer issues; the marketplace; and cost. Among other things, the task
force recommended that: federal, state, and local testing and certification
procedures be strengthened; there be a permanent paper record for each
election, whether a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or a print-out
once all ballots are cast; VVPATs be allowed but not required as an option
for local election officials to select; and state or federal funds be provided
to pay the cost of upgrading systems to meet any new recommendations
that are implemented.
KEVIN COLEMAN & RICHARD M. NUNNO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, RS20639: INTERNET VOTING: ISSUES AND LEGISLATION (Jan. 16,

2001), http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/govemment/gov-41.cfm.
In this report, an overview of Internet voting and the common issues
associated with it are addressed. The report indicates voters seek greater
security than that which was available at the time of Internet voting's
creation. Additionally, the digital divide is referenced along with the
advantages Internet voting will provide to those with higher income and
better education. The report states that additional fraud protection would be
needed for secure Internet voting and that improperly addressed security
issues will undermine voter confidence. A brief overview of types of
Internet voting, available technology, equal access and retaining ballot
secrecy are provided in the report. Additionally, the report references
recent uses of the Internet in elections in Arizona and Alaska.
COMM1ITEE ON A FRAMEWORK

FOR UNDERSTANDING

ELECTRONIC

VOTING, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

ABOUT ELECTRONIC VOTING (Richard Celeste et al. eds., 2006), available
at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1 1449.html.
This report examines the questions and issues surrounding the use of
technology in the electoral process. The report begins by looking at the
electoral system, its decentralized nature, its parts, and its scope and
complexity. Next it looks at the role public confidence in elections plays in
our democracy. The third part of the report identifies different voting
technologies while the fourth part discusses the security and usability issues
that have arisen with the new voting systems. The authors acknowledge the
different perspectives of election officials and computer scientist skeptics
on security, but do not see them as irreconcilable. The authors pose sixteen
security questions and eighteen usability questions that should be asked
when looking at voting technology. Part five of the report discusses the
increased costs, complexity, and broadening of the poll worker's responsibilities with newer voting technology. The authors pose eleven questions
regarding these issues. Part six of the report looks at research and data that
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should be collected in order to evaluate and audit voting machine performance, testing and certification processes, funding, the role of private actors
in the electoral processes, and how these issues relate to public confidence
in elections. The committee concludes that new voting technologies have
enormous potential but that more work needs to be done to improve current
voting systems. They believe that all stakeholders have relevant contributions to make.
COMPUWARE, DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC
SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT (Nov. 21, 2003),

(DRE)

TECHNICAL

http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/compuware112103.pdf.
When Ohio went to purchase new voting machines in conjunction with
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), the Secretary of State
commissioned Compuware to examine the security of direct recording
electronic devices (DREs) from four vendors: the Diebold AccuVote-TS
R6, the ES&S iVotronic, the Hart InterCivic eslate 3000, and the Sequoia
AVC Edge. Compuware tested source code, operating systems, and
hardware. In their code review they looked for compliance with standard
programming practices, security features and error handling logic, database
security, and documentation. Compuware found serious security risks with
each vendor's products. The report includes recommendations to mitigate
each risk. Furthermore, Compuware found general vulnerabilities to the
election process and recommended that the Secretary of State develop IT
and security standards and plans beyond those of the Federal Election
Commission, create a Security Director position, implement statewide
security standards, create a formal security training program for counties,
require vendors to achieve Software Engineering Institute CMM Level 3,
and conduct independent testing of voting systems as new versions of DRE
software and hardware are released.
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN

U.S. ELECTIONS (Sept. 2005),
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/fulLreport.pdf.
The bi-partisan Commission on Federal Election Reform, co-chaired
by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State Jim Baker,
was created to identify ways to rebuild voter confidence in the election
system. The report makes eighty-seven specific recommendations that fall
under five pillars. Those related to voting technology consist of: (1) fully
implementing and funding the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); (2) adding
to HAVA a requirement that all voting machines possess a voter-verifiable
paper audit trail and be fully accessible to the disabled; (3) researching and
developing new technology to make voting systems more transparent and
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secure; (4) developing procedures concerning the ballot of record, whether
paper or electronic; (5) publicly testing all voting machines before, during,
and after the election; (6) requiring independent certification of voting
machine source code; (7) putting source code in an escrow for future review
by experts; (8) verifying on delivery that software on a machine matches
the software that was certified; (9) restricting access to voting equipment
and documenting chain-of-custody and any changes made; (10) developing
backup plans in case of equipment failure; (11) researching and experimenting more with Internet voting; and (12) changing the make-up of the
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and increasing its independence
and authority in order to implement the above listed reforms. The report
also features an appendix on the estimated costs of implementing the
reforms that were recommended.
DEREK DICTSON & DAN RAY, SECUREPOLL.COM, THE MODERN
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: AN OBJECTIVE SURVEY OF INTERNET-BASED
ELECTIONS (Jan. 2000),
http://e-voto.di.fc.ul.pt/docs/The%20Modern%2ODemocratic%20
Revolution.pdf.
This White Paper provides an overview of the arguments both for and
against Internet voting. The current political and social climates, with
respect to Internet voting, are considered. Pros and cons of such technology
and the policy and technological changes needed and currently underway
are discussed. An overview of the current, traditional voting method is
provided. The report then gets into detail on how the system would be
changed with Internet voting. The report references various types of
Internet voting ranging from Internet voting at a polling place to remote
voting from any computer. The report lays out arguments in favor of
Internet voting, including convenience, the fact that voters would be better
informed, the idea that the voting and counting process would be streamlined and more efficient, and the potential for providing greater access to
the polls. The drawbacks to Internet voting are also laid out. These include
security issues, lack of Internet access by all voters ("digital divide"), the
erosion of the community event of voting, lack of a paper trail, and other
distrust issues related to Internet voting. A discussion of necessary
standards for Internet voting is provided, as is an analysis of current state
effort in Internet or other online voting efforts. The report concludes with a
look to what may be done in the future, including biometrics, the current
development of Internet appliances, and the use of smartcards.
ELECTIONLINE.ORG, BRIEFING:
THE 2006 ELECTION (Nov. 2006),
http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/EB 15.briefing.pdf.
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Electionline.org is a non-partisan website, administered by the Election Reform Information Project that deals with election reform. Electionline.org compiled the data used in this briefing, the fifteenth in a series
of briefings, from press reports, field reports from organizations, and firstperson observations from Electionline.org staffers. The report gives a
snapshot of the problems that were reported during the 2006 election. In
addition to breaking down problems by state, the report categorizes the
problems as man versus machine (human error causing problems with
voting machines), machine versus man (machine incidents), and unknown.
Among the problems noted were vote flipping, blank ballots, missing ballot
activator cards, ballots jamming, machines not starting, programming
errors, and machines breaking down.
ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING:

THE BUSINESS OF

ELECTIONS (Aug. 2004),

http://www.electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/The%20Business%20of
%20Elections.pdf.
With the negative publicity surrounding voting machine performance
and security after the 2000 election, companies that produce and maintain
voting machines have come under increased scrutiny. This Electionline.org
report examines campaign finance reports and lobbying expenses of some
of the largest voting machine companies and looks at the procurement
process of states in an effort to identify the influence these companies might
have on the political process. Electionline.org finds that the industry does
engage in lobbying and donates to campaigns but there is no industry-wide
practice favoring one political party over another. The report suggests
potential responses to perceived or potential bias and influence could be to
prohibit contributions or limit participation in securing contracts to
companies that do not make political contributions. The report notes that
vendors have formed the Election Technology Council, a group to handle
public relations for direct recording election devices (DREs), develop a
code of ethics for voting machine companies, and make recommendations
on standards and certification. The report also looks at the voting system
procurement process in the states and finds that while vendors attempt to
influence contracts by touting local economic ties, it is unclear whether this
has the intended influence on the procurement process.
ELECTIONLINE.ORG, BRIEFING:

RECOUNTS:

FROM PUNCH CARDS TO

PAPER TRAILs (Oct. 2005),
http://www.electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/ERIPBriefl 2.SB370upd
ated.pdf.
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In 2005, electionline.org, a non-partisan website administered by the
Election Reform Information Project, conducted a survey of state election
officials to find out the procedures governing recounts and audits. The
resulting report, the twelfth in a series of briefings, addresses recount and
audit procedures focusing on voter-verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs)
and the role they play in audits and recounts. Electionline.org finds twentyfive states require either a VVPAT or paper ballots. Of those twenty-five,
fifteen states specifically require that in recounts, VVPAT, not the
electronic record, will be used. Two states specifically require that the
electronic record, not the VVPAT will be used. The report notes that some
election officials oppose the VVPAT for recounts because of time and that
some advocates for the disabled feel the VVPATs are not accessible. The
report also notes an alternative being developed - the voter verified audio
audit transcript trail (VVAATT). As far as audits go, twelve states require
audits of election machines. Eleven states now require that VVPATs be
used in the audits.
ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM:
HASN'T AND WHY 2000-2006 (2006),

WHAT'S CHANGED,

WHAT

http://www.electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/2006.annual.report.Final.
pdf.
Since 2000, Electionline.org, a non-partisan website administered by
the Election Reform Information Project, has issued an annual report
examining election reform across the United States. The latest report
identifies changes not only since the last report but also compares data from
2006 to 2000. The section on voting machines begins by noting that
although punch-card and lever voting machines have largely been
abandoned, security concerns and uncertainty on standards caused delays
and confusion. In 2000, direct recording electronic devices (DREs) were
widely hailed as the solution to the problems with old machines; however,
concerns about their security, reliability, and accuracy have led to a new
push for voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT). Twenty-five states now
have laws requiring paper trails or paper ballots. Of those twenty-five,
sixteen identify the VVPAT as the official record of vote for a recount,
while two identify electronic ballots as the official record of vote for a
recount. Twelve states use paper trails for post-election audits. In response
to the concerns about paperless electronic voting machines, companies are
producing hybrid systems that are electronic but print out a paper ballot.
The report breaks down the voting systems used and VVPAT requirements
for all fifty states and D.C. in 2000 and 2006. Annual reports for the
previous years of 2004, 2002, and 2001 can be found at:
http://electionline.org/Publications/tabid/86/Default.aspx.
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ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING: ROADS TO REFORM:
PLANNING
FOR THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT (Aug. 2003),

http://www.electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/ERP%20Brief%20803.pdf.
In this briefing, the sixth in a series of briefings from electionline.org
and the Election Reform Information Project, an overview is provided of
state activities aimed at achieving the goals of the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA). The report provides general information as to what states are
doing in light of HAVA. It also gives a brief state-by-state summary of
how HAVA funds will be spent. The report indicates that in those
jurisdictions where funds will be spent to procure new voting machines,
those machines will be direct recording electronic (DRE) or optical scan.
The report also indicates that HAVA funds cannot be used to update
machines in only select areas within a state while leaving antiquated
machines elsewhere within the state. A brief discussion is also provided of
fears associated with the installation and use of electronic voting machines.
ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING: SECURING THE VOTE
(Apr. 2004),
http://www.electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/Securing%20the%2OVot
e.pdf.
This briefing is the seventh in a series of briefings from electionline.org and the Election Reform Information Project. In this briefing
voting security is covered. A great deal of attention is given to addressing
the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) as well as other means of
securing voting systems. The report covers security measures currently in
effect in various states as well as those being considered at the time of the
report. Digital recording electronic (DRE) systems and their lack of
VVPATs are discussed as well as the positions of those who advocate for
and against VVPATs.
Software upgrades are discussed as well as
difficulties in having last minute upgrades properly approved. An overview
of the current voting systems companies is provided, as well as a state-bystate summary of voting systems in use and their security status.
ELECTRONIC VOTING AND DEMOCRACY:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

(Norbert Kersting & Harald Baldersheim eds., 2004).
This book is a compilation of chapters by various authors. The focus
of the book is electronic voting generally in the world. It does not focus
wholly on a particular country. Coverage is provided for Australia, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Western Europe (generally), the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Chapters focusing specifically on
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the United States are: chapter 4-Electronic Voting in the United States: At
the Leading Edge or Lagging Behind, chapter 13-Support for Online
Voting in the United States, and chapter 14-Digital Democracy Comes of
Age: Internet Voting and the 2000 Arizona DemocraticPrimary. Frederic
I. Solop, author of chapter 4, is a professor at the University of Northern
Arizona. Prof. Solop discusses the introduction of the Internet generally in
the United States and the swift move to use it in politics and government.
He provides a discussion of how the Internet was used in the 2000
Presidential election. The author identifies the first use of Internet elections
in the United States (the United States being the first in the world to employ
such a method) in the private sector. He provides information on the
election laws of the United States and how they affected the events of 2000
and subsequent election reform discussions. His chapter concludes with a
brief discussion of Internet voting viability. In chapter 13, written by
Ramona S. McNeal and Caroline J. Tolbert, a discussion of the evolution of
e-voting in the U.S. and how it has been used is provided. Additionally,
information is provided from a study done by Kent State University's
Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing lab related to Internet voting
and online voter registration. Written and tabular results are provided.
Lastly, chapter 14, again by Frederic I. Solop, focuses on the 2000 Arizona
Democratic Primary. In this chapter he discusses digital democracy
indicating that it refers to "the integration of Internet technologies into the
functions of government and the apparatus of democracy." He then
provides a look at the Arizona Primary including discussions of types of
voters and their demographics and attitudes.
Other chapters within this
title will be useful to anyone interested in electronic voting. Some chapters
are general in scope and others are country specific to those nations
mentioned above.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 2002 VOTING SYSTEM STANDARDS

(2002), http://www.eac.gov/electionresources/vss.htnl.
These 2002 standards, developed by the Federal Election Commission
and later adopted by the Election Assistance Committee, were the precursor
for the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines listed later in this bibliography. They replaced the 1990 standards, providing new and expanded
coverage of paper-based and electronic voting systems. The standards are
divided into two volumes. Volume one consists of nine sections dealing
with performance standards, such as hardware, software, functional
capabilities, telecommunications, security, quality assurance, configuration
management, and qualification tests for electronic components of voting
systems. Volume one also contains three appendices featuring a glossary,
references, and a section on usability design. Volume two consists of seven
sections dealing with the testing and qualification process, such as the
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technical data package vendors need to submit, functionality testing,
hardware testing, software testing, system level integration testing, and
testing for vendor practices regarding configuration management and
quality assurance. Volume two also contains three appendices providing a
recommended outline for a qualification test plan, a recommended outline
for a qualification report, and the design criteria used for the testing
process.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, DEVELOPING A USER-CENTERED
VOTING SYSTEM (Oct. 2003), http://www.eac.gov/docs/developing.pdf.

This is a guide from the Federal Election Commission's Office on
Election Administration. Its purpose is directed toward "voting system
developers" and is intended to help them create usable systems. The guide
is also directed at those officials who are procuring voting systems to help
them make better choices in selecting user-friendly systems. The guide
focuses on two aspects of "user-centered" systems: usability and accessibility. A detailed definition of each is provided. Additionally, user-centered
design, human factors, and human factors engineering are defined. The
design process is covered with not just voters, but election officials being
identified as users. Systems should meet requirements for tabulation and
recordation of votes and keep in mind the users of that function as well as
voters. User research needs to be done via interviews, identifying tasks,
and by comparing use to other systems in place among others. Some
requirements for a user-centered system are identified as well as the
development of the necessary interface. Evaluating the design throughout
the creation of the system is recommended and components of usability
testing are given. Voting system standards are identified and design audits
are discussed.
FEDERAL

ELECTION

COMMISSION,

USABILITY

TESTING

OF VOTING

SYSTEMS (Oct. 2003), http://www.eac.gov/docs/usability.pdf.

This document provides guidance to makers of electronic voting
equipment on how to perform a usability test. The document defines a
usability test as "an established technique for evaluating the quality of
human interaction with various system components, including equipment,
documents, architectural elements, environmental factors and other people."
The usability tests are intended to identify stumbling blocks in the system
prior to its implementation. The document recommends that the tests be
conducted earlier in the development process, rather than when it is too late
to make significant changes to the system. The document lays out specific
ways in which tests can be conducted and provides guidance on when,
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where, and how such test should be done. Objectives are laid out and a
manner in which findings should be reported is indicated.
C. VIRGINIA FIELDS & THE CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE OF THE DISABLED
IN NEW YORK, INC., VOTING TECHNOLOGY FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES (Mar. 2003),

http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/VotingTechnologyfor
PeopleWithDisabilities.pdf.
In 2002, the Manhattan Borough President's Office and the Center for
Independence of the Disabled in New York sponsored a voting technology
fair in order to allow people with disabilities to test the accessibility of new
voting technology. Seven companies participated in the fair. One hundred
thirty individuals took an anonymous survey evaluating the machines. This
report incorporates observations, comments, and interviews of people and
voting machine manufacturers regarding five disability categories
(wheelchair access, dexterity and arm range access, visual impairment
access, hearing impairment access, and cognitive and neurological
impairment access) and the performance of the participating voting
machines in those categories. It also issues general recommendations on
important accessibility features.
BRIAN L. FIFE & GERALYN M. MILLER, POLITICAL CULTURE AND VOTING

SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002).

In this book, the authors look at the impact of political culture on the
choice of voting systems used in different jurisdictions. They define
political culture as how people view politics and the role of government in
society. In the first chapter, they give an overview of the Bush v. Gore
controversy. In the second chapter, the authors explore three subcultures:
(1) moralistic, where government and politics are expected to promote the
public welfare; (2) individualistic, where government and politics are
viewed as having a minimal role restricted to some social and economic
roles; and (3) traditionalistic, where hierarchy is respected and elites govern
to improve society. They associate the North, Northwest, and Pacific Coast
states with the moralistic subculture, Midwestern and Southwestern states
with the individualistic subculture, and the Southern states with the
traditionalistic culture. After examining election data, they find moralistic
states use paper ballots (paper and optical scan) more than other systems,
traditionalist states use direct recording electronic devices (DREs) more
often than other systems, and mechanical lever machines are used more
often in individualistic states. Since the type of voting machine used may
have an impact on the number of votes counted, the authors assert that more
study is needed on the impact of political culture. They argue that
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implementing a uniform voting system, such as optical scanning machines,
in order to address equal protection concerns regarding the use of different
voting machines, would not work because political culture may also play a
role in the administration of an election, and therefore, in error rates. A
better role for the federal government would be to support election
administration in the states.
ERIC A.

FISCHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ELECTION
REFORM AND ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS (DREs): ANALYSIS OF

SECURITY ISSUES (Nov. 4, 2003),

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31341.pdf.
This report, prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research
Service, covers concerns related to digital recording electronic devices
(DREs) and proposes remedies. Background information is provided on the
history of voting and the various voting mechanisms in use in the United
States. A detailed discussion of the DRE security issues is provided along
with a summary of various studies done on the issue (e.g., Caltech/MIT,
California Task Force, Hopkins). Mr. Fischer describes the types of threats
possible to the voting system, the technical vulnerabilities (computer codes,
connecting to other systems and auditing), and "social vulnerabilities." He
addresses the goals in defending such attacks and responding to problems
discovered within a DRE system. He outlines ways to address the security
issues ranging from using current standards and improving standards and
certification procedures to using open source coding. He discusses the
voter verified paper trail and an electronic version of it called the Votometer. Additionally, he provides a discussion of using cryptography to encrypt
votes. The report also identifies action that could be considered by the
states, the Election Assistance Commission, and Congress.
ERIC A. FISCHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VOTING
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR

CONGRESS (updated Mar. 21, 2001),
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/politics/voting/r130773.pdf.
This report, prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research
Service, provides a summary of voting technologies in place just after the
2000 presidential election. A discussion of ballot design is given, as is a
discussion regarding the identification of voting errors: (1) overvotes, (2)
undervotes, and (3) unintended votes. A brief description of various voting
systems is provided. A discussion of remote voting based on newer
technologies is given. Additionally, issues related to counting the vote are
covered. Ballot secrecy issues are also discussed.
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ERIC A. FISCHER & KEVIN COLEMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS (DREs): LEGISLATION IN THE
108TH CONGRESS (Aug. 11, 2004),

http://www.cdt.org/righttoknow/crsreports/RL32526_20040811 .pdf.
This report, prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research
Service, details the legislation introduced in the 108 th Congress to address
concerns related to electronic voting. While not requiring specific
machines, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in some ways "promotes"
the use of digital recording electronic devices (DREs) to achieve its ends.
The report identifies controversies over the security of DREs and references
legislation introduced to address these concerns. Additionally, the report
covers legislation that was introduced to address the voter verified paper
trail (VVPT) issues. The bills cover pre-vote casting verification by all
voters, including those with disabilities, and the necessary systems to
achieve this. For systems unable to produce VVPTs as potentially required,
legislation is discussed that would provide for an interim system. Legislation related to recounts is discussed, as well as the potential for the use of
open-source software in the electronic systems used. Other legislation
introduced addresses system testing and security, certification of voter
registration lists (a HAVA related issue), and legislation that would require
states to have voting systems certified by the Election Assistance Commission (something not required under HAVA at the writing of this report).
Cost of new legislation requirements are also discussed briefly in the report.
MICHAEL FOREMAN ET AL., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING
IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
(June 2001), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/main.htm.
After the Florida 2000 election, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights conducted an investigation into voting irregularities and issued
this report. Chapter eight of this report focuses on voting machines. The
commission found that voters in poorer counties with large minority
populations had higher ballot spoilage rates, and that these ballot spoilage
rates were related to the voting technology used. Those voters using
precinct-based optical scanning devices had lower residual vote rates. The
report recommended, among other things, that Florida enact legislation
requiring the use of electronic precinct-counting voting machines to reduce
ballot spoilage, and that such legislation prohibit the dismantling of ballot
error notifications to the voter. The report also recommended that Florida
create a system to annually analyze residual vote rates of voting systems
and consider decertifying systems that have higher residual vote rates than a
set uniform ballot spoilage rate.
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THAD E. HALL & R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, CALTECH/MIT VOTING
TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT ELECTRONIC
VOTING: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (Sept. 9, 2004),

http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/fa1I04survey.pdf.
In response to the debate surrounding new electronic voting technology, the authors conducted this study to survey registered voters on how

they felt about direct recording electronic devices (DREs) and optical
scanning machines. The survey found that voters are comfortable with the
new voting technologies and that slightly more of them are comfortable
with the DREs than the optical scanning machines. Comfort for the new
technologies was highest among Generation Y voters and lowest for voters
fifty-nine and older. African-American voters were more comfortable with
the newer technologies than white voters. Follow up questions were asked
concerning the potential for fraud, greater accuracy, ease of use for disabled
voters, and unintentional machine failures. Many voters, particularly older
voters, did not have an opinion on these questions, causing the authors of
the survey to hypothesize that this reflects uncertainty, unfamiliarity, or
ambivalence about their use. Most voters believed the electronic voting
machines made voting easier for those with disabilities. Younger voters
were more likely to agree that electronic voting systems are more accurate
but also that there is greater potential for fraud and machine glitches.
Independents believed the machines were more accurate than Democrats or
Republicans.
BEV HARRIS, BLACK Box VOTING:

BALLOT TAMPERING IN THE

2 1 ST

CENTURY (2004), available at http://www.blackboxvoting.org/book.html.
The founder of Black Box Voting, a non-profit, non-partisan group
dedicated to ensuring that elections are accurate and fair, Bev Harris has
written numerous articles on electronic voting. In this book, she provides
extensive examples of voting machine errors and their impact on the
elections involved. She looks at the case of Senator Chuck Hagel and his
undisclosed interests in the company that owns the voting machines used to
count the votes in his own election. She provides a brief overview of
historical election-rigging methods and then discusses the security problems
with electronic voting machines and the new ways they can be exploited to
rig an election. She examines the voting machine industry, its lobbying
efforts, and some flaws with the certification system. She investigates the
parent companies, owners, and key personnel of the major voting machine
manufacturers and reports some disturbing finds. She tells the story of
finding Diebold source code posted on an FTP site and its connection with
uncertified software on Georgia election machines. She includes comments
from programmers who examined this code. The files on this FTP site were
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later used by Aviel Rubin and the other authors of the John Hopkins/Rice
University report. She discusses the role and the reluctance of the press in
monitoring issues like the security flaws in electronic voting machines. She
advocates auditing of elections and machines, background checks of
personnel, transparent vote counting, and new procedural safeguards. She
identifies ways for ordinary people to get involved in the issue and critiques
the new voting industry organization, the Information Technology
Association of America (ITAA).
Richard L. Hasen, After the Storm: The Uses, Normative Implications, and
Unintended Consequences of Voting Reform Research in Post-Bush v. Gore
Equal Protection Challenges, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS
AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 185 (Ann N. Crigler et
al. eds., 2004).
In this chapter of Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of
American Election Reform, the author looks at the effect of Bush v. Gore on
subsequent electoral equal protection challenges. He begins by reviewing
previous Supreme Court precedent on voting issues. Then he looks at Bush
v. Gore and the question of whether or not the Court intended the equal
protection holding to apply to subsequent voting issues. He finds that
regardless of whether the Court will retreat from applying this new
expansion of the equal protection doctrine to other voting situations,
lawsuits will be filed and lower courts will grapple with the Bush v. Gore
holding. He believes that social science research, such as that on residual
votes, will be needed to provide empirical evidence for these lawsuits. He
also sees unintended consequences of this new emphasis on social science
research in the courts and the voting reform efforts, such as chilling
experimentation with new voting systems.
PAUL S. HERRNSON ET AL., THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF ELECTRONIC
VOTING: RESULTS FROM A USABILITY FIELD TEST,
http://www.capc.umd.edu/rpts/Promise-andPitfalls-ofElectronicVoting.
pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
This study examined the usability of six representative voting systems
using a demographically diverse group of people, skewed slightly older,
with a variety of computer experience. Each system was tested using ballot
formats with features a voter might typically come across. The researchers
focused on the voters' comfort and confidence in the system; how well they
understood the ballot; the ease of changing votes, correcting mistakes, and
writing in votes; and whether they felt the need to ask for help. The
researchers hypothesized that the most computer savvy, highly educated,
young, white, male, partisan, experienced voters would rate the electronic
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voting machines more highly. Generally, they found that the electronic
voting machines were all rated highly and that touch screen devices ranked
highest on the confidence questions. The authors detailed their findings for
the machines tested in each type of voting system (optical scan, touch
screens, wheels and buttons, and membrane button full-screen system) and
ultimately found that their results did not support their hypothesis. They
did find that age, sex, education, race, and computer experience did
correspond to feeling the need to ask for help. The authors conclude that
individual features of voting machines can impact usability; they identify
highly rated features that could improve electronic voting; and they identify
groups of voters likely to need additional help when voting.
RANDOLPH

C. HITE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS:

ELECTRONIC

VOTING

OFFERS

OPPORTUNITIES

AND

PRESENTS

CHALLENGES (May 12, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04766T.
This report is a copy of Mr. Hite's (Director, Information Technology
Architecture and Systems) prepared statement for the Subcommittee on
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the
Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. In
this statement Mr. Hite summarizes the seven reports produced by his office
on election related topics after the 2000 election. The seven reports
encompass the following topics: (1) constitutional framework for election
administration, (2) "voting assistance" for voters in the military and
overseas, (3) the likelihood of not properly counting votes of minority and
disadvantaged voters, (4) voting accessibility for those with disabilities, (5)
the status of "voting equipment standards developed by the federal election
commission," (6) various challenges to elections across the nation, and (7) a
"framework for evaluating election administration reform proposals." Mr.
Hite's statement also discusses the two main electronic voting systems direct recording electronic devices (DREs) and optical scanners. He
provides descriptions of the voting methods in each system and identifies
some of the concerns and benefits related to the systems. He also addresses
greater issues related to the election process and not specific to electronic
voting (e.g. language diversity of voters, size and complexity of voting
regions). He presents various ways to evaluate electronic voting systems
outside the issues relating to security (e.g. ease of use, accuracy, cost,
efficiency). Mr. Hite asserts the need for clearly defined standards against
which the system can be measured and indicates the necessity of making
available the proper testing, maintenance and training.
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INTERNET POLICY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
INTERNET VOTING: ISSUES AND RESEARCH AGENDA (Mar. 2001),

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/election2000/nsfe-voterprt.pdf.
This report, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, looks at
the feasibility of different forms of Internet voting. The report groups
Internet voting into three categories: (1) poll site voting, (2) kiosk voting,
and (3) remote voting. A description of each type of voting is provided.
Generally, poll site Internet voting was seen as the most feasible in the
relatively near future. The report identifies a list of what the authors term
"critical research areas" to be looked at before the use of Internet voting.
The report identifies most issues related to Internet voting as connected to
security, convenience and cost. The report identifies the current (at the time
of the report) voting systems in use and the criteria needed for developing a
voting system. Additionally, the report identifies the vulnerabilities with
Internet voting.
These include, among others, security, reliability,
certification issues, source code, "platform compatibility," and secrecy. A
discussion is also presented on whether Internet voting will increase or in
any way affect voter participation and access. The changes that may be
needed or inevitably come about with Internet voting are covered. Potential
legal issues and issues related to voter registration are addressed. The
report concludes with the findings of the study on feasibility. Generally,
poll site Internet voting is possible in the near future, the risks related to
remote voting require "substantial technical and social science issues [be]
addressed," and the risks associated with Internet-based initial voter
registration are too great for implementation any time soon. A December
17, 1999 White House Memorandum directed to the heads of the executive
department and agencies on Electronic Government is included in appendix
A, and appendix C contains a glossary. Other appendices contain related
reading materials, participants and names of IPI Board members.
DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) (Jan. 21,

2004), http://servesecurityreport.org/paper.pdf.
The Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)
was an Internet voting system built for the Department of Defense's Federal
Voting Assistance Program for U.S. citizens living outside the U.S. and
military personnel and their dependents. This report evaluates the security
risks of the system and ultimately recommended that SERVE be shut down,
which it was. The report compares the SERVE system against the standard
of current absentee voting systems and finds that although current absentee
voting systems also have security vulnerabilities, they are fewer and on a
smaller scale than those found in SERVE. The report highlights the lack of
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a voter-verified audit trail; risk of cyber attacks such as viruses, denial of
service attacks, spoofing, and automated vote buying; the potential for
large-scale voter disenfranchisement, vote switching, and privacy violations
if an attack does happen; the ease of such an attack; and the inability to fix
these vulnerabilities with current technologies.
BILL JONES, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA INTERNET
VOTING TASK FORCE, A REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERNET
VOTING (Jan. 2000), http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/final-report.pdf.

This report from the California Internet Voting Task Force addresses
the introduction of Internet voting to California. The report was developed
through the input of over two-dozen experts in the fields of elections, voter
participation and data security. A phase-in approach to Internet voting is
recommended in the report. The compilers indicate such an action would
enhance user confidence in the technology. The report covers election
equipment, its approval and the approval of Internet voting systems.
Reasons why Internet voting could not immediately replace the current
system are also discussed. Among these are the need to be able to digitally
identify voters, voter registration security, inability (without the first item)
to have digital signatures on initiatives and referendum, and the fact that not
all voters have access to and the ability to use a computer. A model for
Internet voting is presented and a suggested phase-in of Internet voting is
provided. The phase-in consists of four stages: (1) Internet voting at voter's
own polling places, (2) Internet voting at any polling place, (3) remote
Internet voting at specified kiosks, and (4) remote Internet voting from
anywhere. The report indicates the various security risks involved with this
system and presents system requirements for each stage. Two appendices
are attached. Appendix A is the technical report to accompany the written
findings. Appendix B is a two question statewide survey: (1) Do you favor
or oppose Internet voting?; and (2) Do you have access to the Internet
and/or e-mail?
Arthur M. Keller et al., PrivacyIssues in an Electronic Voting Machine, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY

CONVERSATION 313 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu, eds.,
2006), availableat
http://www-db.stanford.edu/pub/keller/2005/privacy-electronic-votingchapter.pdf.
In chapter eighteen of this book, the authors describe the Open Voting
Consortium model election system, focusing on how it addresses privacy
concerns. They begin with a look at how and where voter anonymity can
be compromised and then examine the Open Voting Consortium PC-based
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open source voting machine with an accessible voter-verified paper trail.
They argue that open source code is necessary in order to eliminate threats
to voter privacy. Their model includes privacy protecting details such as:
(1) randomizing ballot-IDs, (2) using bar codes where voting patterns
cannot be visually recognized, (3) encrypting and requiring digital
signatures for voting tokens, (4) changing the way electronic ballot images
are stored on the electronic voting machines, (5) designing machines with
regular and reading impaired interfaces, (6) designing ballots with multiple
languages, (7) privacy folders, (8) headphones for ballot validation stations,
(9) shuffling ballots, (10) totaling the votes at the precinct, and (11)
establishing chain-of-custody procedures for ballots.
DAVID C. KIMBALL, ASSESSING VOTING METHODS IN

2002 (July 2004),

http://www.umsl.edu/-kimballd/dkmpsa2.pdf.
In this study, the author examines newer voting technology after the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and its impact on residual votes
in the 2002 gubernatorial elections. He begins by looking at the causes of
residual votes. He notes that most counties buying new voting equipment
in 2000, bought direct recording electronic devices (DREs). He finds that
precinct-count optical scanners and touch screen DREs have lower residual
vote counts than other voting systems; punch card ballots have higher
residual vote counts; central-count optical scanning systems are on par with
paper ballots and lever machines; and older full-face DREs were worse than
all but punch cards. He also finds that while residual votes are higher in
counties with more African-American, Hispanic, or elderly voters;
education, income, and population did not seem to impact residual votes.
Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin & Dan S. Wallach,
Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, in IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 27 (2004), availableat
http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf.
This leading report, on electronic voting security, was produced
through work done at the Johns Hopkins University Information Security
Institute. The authors provide an overview of the reasons for moving to
electronic voting systems and then provide a specific analysis of the
AccuVote-TS version 4 tree from Diebold, a digital recording electronic
(DRE) system. Significant flaws were found in this electronic voting
system. Among the flaws are a voters ability to program his or her own
smartcard to tamper with the vote, the potential for interfering with
communications to and from the voting systems, lack of proper "cryptographic techniques," and the lack of paper trails of voting records. A
system overview is provided which details setting the systems up, how they
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are used in an election setting and a discussion of the coding used in the
systems. The authors identify numerous ways that smartcard technology
can be used by "an adversary" to change votes, vote more than once, and
override administrator functions within the system. Additionally, the report
identifies ways in which the memory system in the terminals can be
accessed and affected, as well as the initial "ballot definition," which is
used to portray the ballot and provide specific election choices to the voter.
Potential problems with the "ballot definition" are seen whether the
information is already on the voting machine and access is made to such
systems prior to the election or if the "ballot definition" information is
transmitted over a network connection. The authors provide a discussion of
other security flaws such as someone using a computer to act as a legitimate
voting terminal in order to affect voting information and the improper use
of available cryptographic measures. Additionally, the authors see ways in
which individual voters can be identified and linked to their specific votes.
A discussion of the coding process and lack of attention to known flaws is
presented. The authors identify some ways of providing some level of
security by suggesting the use of open source coding and some sort of paper
trail.
SHARON J. LASKOWSKI ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND

TECHNOLOGY, IMPROVING THE USABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF VOTING
SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTS (May 2004), http://www.vote.nist.gov/Final

Human Factors Report 5-04.pdf.
This report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology was
mandated under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). The report
focuses on the user interaction with the voting machine not on voting
system accuracy or security. The authors analyze potential usability and
accessibility problems in voting products. They review current usability
and accessibility requirements and standards, both related and unrelated to
voting systems, as well as governmental and nongovernmental. They also
examine existing usability and accessibility research, both basic and as
applied to voting systems. The report asserts that studies specific to voting
systems are few, informal, and lack statistical validity and reliability. The
report provides ten recommendations:
(1) to develop measurable,
performance-based voting system standards; (2) provide user-related
functional requirements for voting machines in the standards; (3) avoid
setting out detailed product design specifications or very general specifications for usability in the standards; (4) encourage and build applied research
on voting systems to support the standards; (5) promulgate detailed design
specifications for accessibility; (6) provide ballot design guidelines based
on visual design research; (7) develop guidelines for facility and equipment
layout; (8) promote a user-centric design process for venders; (9) create a

20071

0 BRAVE NEw WORLD?

uniform set of procedures to test the accessibility of voting machines; and
(10) create a process to test usability of voting machines. After the
recommendations, the authors outline short and long-term steps needed to
implement the recommendations. The appendices of the report include
suggestions on developing test procedures and protocols.
ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, REPORT ON THE RACIAL IMPACT OF THE REJECTION
OF BALLOTS CAST IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE STATE OF

FLORIDA (June 2001),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/appendix/lichtman/ltrpt.htm.
This study, requested by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, used county and precinct-level data from Miami-Dade, Duval, and
Palm Beach Florida counties from the 2000 election. The author finds that
in the Florida 2000 election, African-Americans faced statistically
significant ballot rejection rates. He states that the rejection rates were not
related to the educational level and that one minimal factor was the type of
voting technology used. African-American voters from counties that used
punch-cards and centrally-counting optical scanning systems had the
highest rejection rates. The author concludes that accepted ballot rates for
African-American voters could be improved through the use of precinctcounting optical scanning systems, but that technology alone will not
change racial disparities in ballot rejection.
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE
PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (Aug. 2001),

http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReform/99_fullreport.pdf.
The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, chaired by
former Presidents Ford and Carter, was formed in response to the 2000
election. The commission examined election reform and issued a final
report in 2001. Many recommendations in this report were incorporated
into the Help America Vote Act of 2002. Chapter five of the report deals
with voting equipment. Regarding voting equipment, the commission
recommended that each state set a voting system performance benchmark
regarding residual votes and that the federal government create uniform
voting system standards and resources for applying those standards.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS EVALUATION, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS AND THE
ELECTION REFORM:
AMERICA'S
FOR
IMPROVING
RECOMMENDATIONS
COMMISSION'S
ELECTION SYSTEMS (Nov. 2001),

http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/elecref/main.htm.
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In this report, the Office for Civil Rights Evaluation begins by looking
at existing laws, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993, and reviewing their enforcement mechanisms. The second chapter analyzes proposed and recently enacted federal
legislation (including the legislation that eventually became the Help
America Vote Act of 2002). Chapter three looks at recommendations made
by a number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The
final chapter presents the Commission's eighteen recommendations.
Among those related to technology are: (1) national standards, (2) federal
funding for reform, (3) uniform tracking and reporting of election data, and
(4) election checklists.
Trevor Potter & Marianne Holt Viray, Federal Election Authority:
Jurisdictionand Mandates, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND
PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 102 (Ann N. Crigler et al.
eds., 2004).
The authors of this chapter begin by reviewing Congressional authority
to implement election reform. Next they look at the history of federal
election reform efforts. Finally, they examine reforms that the federal
government needs to establish. They classify these reforms in four areas:
(1) collecting and disseminating information about voting issues; (2)
researching and testing voting machines; (3) updating and creating new
standards on voting systems and election administration; and (4) providing
permanent federal funding assistance to states to improve election
machinery and administration.
RABA TECHNOLOGIES INNOVATIVE SOLUTION CELL (RISC), TRUSTED
AGENT

REPORT

DIEBOLD

ACCUVOTE-TS

VOTING

SYSTEM

(2004),

http://www.raba.com/press/TA-Report-AccuVote.pdf.
This is another independent report requested by the State of Maryland
on the security vulnerabilities of direct recording electronic devices
(DREs). They performed a Red Team exercise, a simulation of an actual
event where team members experiment with attack scenarios, and,
consistent with other reports, found serious security risks with the Diebold
AccuVote-TS voting system. They focused on vulnerabilities with the
smart cards, terminals, server security, and upload procedures. In their
report, they also responded to the studies of this system by Aviel D. Rubin
and SAIC. They agreed with many of the technical conclusions of Rubin
and also with the mitigating recommendations of SAIC.
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AVIEL D. RUBIN, BRAVE NEW BALLOT (2006).

After activist Bev Harris discovered Diebold's election machine
source code on an open FTP site, Rubin and a group of computer scientists
began analyzing it. In this book, Rubin tells the story of the report and the
aftermath. He chronicles the media coverage and the criticisms of the
report, including those from unexpected quarters. He discusses his
experiences testifying before congressional committees, government
commissions, and courts. He also discusses his frustrations with the
inability to effect immediate and meaningful change. While much of the
controversy was going on, Rubin served on the technical advisory board of
a company, VoteHere, billed by some as one of Diebold's rival election
machine manufacturers, and in the book he discusses this conflict of interest
and how it impacted his credibility. He also explains reactions to the
subsequent security reports on Diebold's machines: the SAIC, Risk
Assessment Report DieboldAccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes; the
Compuware, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technical Security
Assessment Report; and the RABA Technology's Innovative Solution Cell
(RiSC), Trusted Agent Report Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System.
RoY G. SALTMAN, AUDITABILITY OF NON-BALLOT, POLL-SITE VOTING
SYSTEMS (Rev. Aug. 24, 2003),

http://www.vote.nist.gov/pospapers/SaltmanAuditabilityofDREs(Revised)2003.pdf.
The author of this report discusses the vulnerabilities of ballotcounting voting systems and direct recording electronic devices (DREs).
He proposes better ways to improve voter confidence in the election system
than requiring hard-copy ballots from DREs. His recommendations focus
on design changes in DREs and the administration of the voting system.
RoY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY:
IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (2006).
In this book, Mr. Saltman discusses the 2000 Presidential election,
provides a history of voting and voting movements in the United States, and
concludes with a discussion of life after the 2000 election. The book
chapters include: (1) The 2000 PresidentialElection in Florida:The Family
Secret Exposed; (2) From the Revolution to the Civil War: Consent of the
Governed and the Election Clause; (3) The Late Nineteenth Century:
Struggling with Corruption and Fraud; (4) The Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Century: Mechanization and PoliticalReforms; (5) The Middle
and Late Twentieth Century: Movements for Equality, Enfranchisement,
and Voting Facilitation; (6) The Middle and Late Twentieth Century:
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Election Administration and Computing Technology; and (7) The Great
Awakening after Florida,through July 2005. The last chapter is the most
relevant to the coverage of this bibliography. In this chapter the author
covers the different types of voting technologies and their residual rates.
He defines this as "a measure of human performance in using voting
systems." Mr. Saltman references the numerous studies on voting technology undertaken since the 2000 election. These include the Caltech/MIT
Voting Technology Project, the U.C. Berkley study and various state and
city studies. He discusses reasons for high residual rates and the differing
rates based on socio-economic status. He discusses cases brought against
the punch-card systems and provides a discussion of the Help America
Vote Act (HAVA).
Mr. Saltman addresses digital electronic recording (DRE) systems and
the security issues that are voiced regarding such systems. He identifies
issues raised after the 2000 election and those raised later as more DRE
systems were being acquired. He also briefly covers Internet voting. A
discussion of the 2004 election and actions taken after that election with
respect to voting systems is provided. The author concludes the chapter
with recommendation for administrative and legislative action and
identifies subjects he indicates are in need of further examination. The
book provides an in depth reference list and an index.
SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING (Dimitris A. Gritzalis ed., 2003).
This book is a compilation work. Each chapter is differently authored
and multiple areas related to electronic voting are covered. The individual
authors are: Danilo Bruschi, Mike Burmester, Lorrie Faith Cranor, David
Chaum, Ivan Damgard, Ed Gerck, Dimitris Gritzalis, Jens Groth, Spyros
Ikonomopoulos, Douglas Jones, Maria Karyda, Sokratis Katsikas, Aggelos
Kiayias, Raphael Kies, Costas Lambrinoudakis, Emmanouil Magkos,
Fernando Mendez, Rebecca Mercuri, Liliam Mitrou, Peter Neumann, Rene
Peralta, Guisi Poletti, Gerald Quirchmayr, Emila Rosti, Gorm Salomonsen,
Roy Saltman, Alexander Treschsel, Vassilis Tsoumas and Moti Yung. As
the preface indicates, the book is separated into three parts. The first part
looks at the current status of electronic voting. The intent of this part is to
introduce the reader to the emerging area of electronic voting and to
provide an analysis of the general requirements necessary for electronic
voting systems. Part two focuses on the trends in electronic voting. One
chapter covers the main electronic voting systems, the security issues
presented by these systems, and ways the security issues can be reduced.
The use of a homomorphic encryption model is discussed and a later
chapter covers this model in more detail and discusses a voting system
based on the model. Part three of the book deals with the capabilities and
limitations of electronic voting systems. Within this section digital
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recording electronic (DRE) systems are discussed, as well as the use of a
plug-in to help with voter privacy issues and the need for multi-disciplinary
involvement in the development of electronic voting systems. Additionally,
security and auditing issues related to electronic voting are covered as well
as remote Internet voting. The materials provided include statistical and
tabular study information as well as descriptive explanations in the various
areas.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS

INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION

(SAIC),

RISK

ASSESSMENT REPORT DIEBOLD ACCuVoTE-TS VOTING SYSTEM AND
PROCESSES (2003),
http://www.elections.state.md.us/pdf/risk-assessment-report.pdf.
SAIC prepared this report on Diebold direct recording electronic devices (DREs) for the State of Maryland. This is one of several independent
reports on the security of DREs. The Risk Assessment examined the voting
system's software, hardware, and processes. They identify several serious
high-risk vulnerabilities and propose mitigation strategies. They also
respond to a critique of the system made by Aviel D. Rubin in another
independent report on the security of DREs.
MICHAEL IAN SHAMOS, PAPER V. ELECTRONIC VOTING RECORDS - AN

ASSESSMENT (Apr. 2004),
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos/paper.htm.
In this paper, the author responds to criticisms of direct recording electronic devices (DREs) and critiques the voter verified paper trail as a valid
solution to DRE security concerns. The author asserts that although there
are security vulnerabilities in DRE machines, they are not insurmountable
and that some vulnerability should be an accepted risk. He looks generally
at paper ballots and finds that they also suffer from serious security
vulnerabilities. He finds them ineffective as a solution to DRE security
concerns not only because of their inherent security flaws, but also because
if the machine cannot be trusted than the paper trail from the machine
cannot be trusted either. He also finds that there are concerns with
anonymity and privacy of votes with a paper trail, that an added printing
device is another mechanical component that can fail, that a papertrail can
create a conflict between multiple ballots, that paper trails are not readily
accessible to disabled voters, and that they decrease voter confidence. His
proposed alternatives to voter-verified paper trails include: (1) making
code open source and auditing it; (2) auditing and parallel testing voting
machines; (3) forcing venders to design and produce quality voting
machines; (4) implementing chain of custody procedures; (5) properly
training poll workers; (6) creating procedures for dealing with voting
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machine irregularities; (7) developing comprehensive voting system
standards; and (8) separating candidate and party names from the voting
software.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION OF THE MINORITY STAFF, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
UNDERCOUNT IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (July 9, 2001),

http://election2000.stanford.edu/house.study.dem.pdf.
This report for the House Democrats was the first analysis of income
and racial disparities and undervotes in the 2000 election that looked at the
issue on a national level. The report examined voting results from forty
congressional districts in twenty states and concluded voters in low-income,
majority-minority districts were more likely to have their votes not counted
than those in high-income, low-minority districts. Furthermore, the report
found that the use of precinct-level optical scanning devices and direct
recording electronic devices (DREs) reduced the number of uncounted
votes across the board, but made a significant difference in lowering the
number of uncounted votes in low-income, majority-minority districts.
CHARLES STEWART mII, CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT,
THE RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES IN GEORGIA (Oct.

2004), http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/wps/vtp-wp20.pdf.
This report looks at what impact the switch to direct recording electronic devices (DREs) had on the residual vote in Georgia. Prior to 2002,
Georgia used a patchwork of different voting machines. Studies of the
previous performance of those machines showed punch-card and mechanical lever machines had higher residual vote rates, while paper and opticalscanning machines had the lowest. After the switch to DREs in 2002, there
was an overall reduction in the residual vote rate, with the greatest
reduction in residual vote rates in counties with more African Americans,
rural counties, low-income counties, and counties with a less educated
population. This result challenges current assumptions regarding DREs and
the digital divide. The author finds that the greatest gains in votes counted
came from the replacement of lever machines not punch-card machines,
which is at odds with the country as a whole. The author cautions that other
factors, such as intense vendor support and poll worker training, may be
partially responsible for the great decline in residual votes.
CHARLES
STEWART
III,
CALTECH/MIT
VOTING
TECHNOLOGY
PROJECT,VOTING MACHINES AND THE UNDERESTIMATE OF THE BUSH

VOTE VERSION 2 (Nov. 11, 2004),
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documentsfVotingMachines3.pdf.
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In response to claims that the 2004 election was stolen by the manipulation of electronic voting machines, the Caltech/ MIT Voting Technology
Project posted a rebuttal based on a statistical examination of exit polls and
states using direct recording electronic devices (DREs). After a state level
analysis of exit polls, and an examination of discrepancies between exit
polls and official returns in states using DREs, no statistically significant
bias was detected.
CHARLES STEWART III, CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT,
ADDENDUM TO VOTING MACHINES AND THE UNDERESTIMATE OF THE

BUSH VOTE (Dec. 5, 2004),
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/AddendumVoting-Machin
esBushVote.pdf.
After new raw exit poll data came to light, the author revisits the perception that the 2004 election was stolen by the manipulations of direct
recording electronic devices (DREs) and reaffirms and expands the
conclusion that there was no statistically significant link between exit poll
data and voting technology. The author asserts exit polls are not designed
to independently audit DREs.
ELLEN THEISEN, VOTERSUNITE!, MYTH BREAKERS:
FACTS ABOUT
ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS (2006), http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf.

The author of this document attempts to dispel common myths regarding direct recording electronic devices (DREs). She begins by discussing
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), noting that HAVA does not
require wholesale replacement of a state's voting equipment, nor does it
require DREs. She then examines electronic voting problems, such as voteflipping, miscounts, and machine failures, in the 2004 elections. The author
discusses the inadequacy of voting system certification requirements at both
the state and federal level. She looks at pre-election testing, pointing out
weaknesses in current testing procedures. She finds that electronic voting
makes elections more complicated and examines the cost and maintenance
challenges of DREs. She identifies alternatives to the paperless DREs such
as: (1) voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), (2) precinct-count optical
scan machines, (3) computerized ballot-marking devices, (4) the Voting-onPaper Assistive Device (Vote-Pad), (5) open voting consortium software,
and (6) hybrid DREs with integrated printing.
DICK THORNBURGH & RICHARD CELESTE, COMMITTEE ON A FRAMEWORK
FOR UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC VOTING, LETTER REPORT ON

ELECTRONIC VOTING (2006), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/l 1704.html.
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In this report, the authors detail the results of the Committee analysis
of electronic voting readiness for the 2006 election. The report covers the
current state of state's preparedness level with respect to the following
issues: (1) Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requirements; (2) state
legislative action related to voter verified paper trails (VVPTs); (3) system
vulnerabilities and security issues; (4) vendor actions, lack of readiness and
provision of faulty equipment; (5) education and availability of poll
workers familiar with the new system; and (6) voter readiness for electronic
voting systems. Additionally, the report discusses the following issues that
have emerged while jurisdictions prepared for the 2006 elections: (1)
awareness of significant cost implications past the equipment acquisition
stage; (2) jurisdiction-vendor relationships and the deterioration of these
relationships; (3) current certification systems may not be appropriate; (4)
vendor involvement outside of the sale of the equipment (testing authorities
are paid by vendors for certification); (5) testing does not address specific
jurisdictional needs; (6) knowledge of electronic voting systems and their
use vary greatly among voting jurisdictions; and (7) influence of advocacy
groups. Recommendations are provided in the report, including the need
for jurisdictions to have back-up systems available in the event a system
fails, the idea that jurisdictions should work together to negotiate with the
relatively small number of vendors, issues related to use and problems with
the systems should be shared among voting jurisdictions, and systems
should have parallel testing performed during an election where feasible.
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, BEST PRACTICES TOOL KIT

(Rev. Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.eac.gov/bp/indexl.asp.
Originally created to help with the November 2004 election, the EAC
compiled this tool kit from recommendations given by election administrators, advocates, and academics at public hearings and a working group of
election administrators. Sections specifically dealing with electronic voting
systems include ten key steps for introducing a new voting system, voting
system vendor management and contract issues, election technology and
equipment, post-election audits, tips for preventing lever machine issues,
tips for preventing punch-card machine issues, tips preventing optical
scanning machine issues, and tips for preventing direct recording electronic
devices (DRE) issues. The document online provides links to examples and
resources mentioned.
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION

PROGRAM MANUAL (2006), http://www.eac.gov/docs/Voting
Testing and Certification Program Manual--Final--120506.pdf.

System
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This manual sets out the procedures for voting machine manufacturers
to follow in order to fulfill the requirements of the United States Election
Assistance Commission Voting System Testing and Certification Program.
The manual is divided into chapters covering: (1) registration requirements
and procedures, (2) circumstances requiring submission of systems for
testing and certification, (3) required steps for voting system testing and
review, (4) steps that must be taken to receive certification and postcertification responsibilities, (5) procedures to follow when certification is
denied, (6) procedures to follow when certification is revoked for a system,
(7) requirements of the quality monitoring process, (8) procedures to follow
when requesting clarification or interpretation of the guidelines, and (9)
policies and procedures for the release of protected commercial trade
secrets and personal information.
I U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2005 VOLUNTARY VOTING

(2005),
http://www.eac.govNVSG%20VolumeI.pdf.
SYSTEM GUIDELINES

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) established the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to, among other things, adopt
voluntary system guidelines and provide for the testing and certification of
voting system technology. The EAC originally adopted the 2002 voting
system standards created by the Federal Election Commission and began
working on new guidelines in 2004. Volume one of these new guidelines
consists of nine sections providing new requirements for usability,
accessibility, functionality, software distribution, a software library,
software validation, wireless communications, and a voter verified paper
audit trail. Volume one possesses four appendices consisting of: (1) a
glossary of terms; (2) a list of related standards and documents; (3) a
discussion of independent verification systems; and (4) accessibility
recommendations regarding color, contrast, and text size.
Id U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2005 VOLUNTARY VOTING
SYSTEM GUIDELINES (2005),

http://www.eac.govNVSG%20VolumejIH.pdf.
Volume two of the voting system guidelines required by the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), revises the process for national
certification of voting systems and the procedures required for usability and
accessibility testing performed by independent accredited voting system test
labs. Volume two consists of seven sections detailing the purpose of
guidelines, Technical Data Package required from vendors when they
submit a system for certification, functionality testing requirements, and
requirements for vendor quality assurance and management practices.
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Volume two contains three appendices providing requirements for the
National Certification Test Plan, scope and content of the National
Certification Test Plan, and the principles used to design the certification
testing process.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
OF FACTORS THAT AFFECTED UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Oct. 2001),

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02122.pdf.
This United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report, requested by the ranking minority leader in the House of Representatives,
examines election data from the 2000 presidential election in order to
determine the extent uncounted votes depended on voting technology used.
Like other studies, the GAO found that counties with higher minority
populations had a higher residual vote rate. Also, counties that used punchcard machines also had a higher percentage of votes uncounted. However,
in contrast to some previous studies, the GAO found that counties using
punch-card machines did not generally have higher minority, less educated,
lower-income populations. The GAO found that although voting technology and demographics did impact uncounted vote percentages, the biggest
factor was in which state the county was. They speculate that differences
among the states such as voter education, straight party ballots, number of
candidates, provisional ballots cast, absentee and early voting ballots, may
account for this.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTIONS: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE SECURITY AND RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS
ARE UNDER WAY, BUT KEY ACTIVITIES NEED TO BE COMPLETED (Sept.

2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf.
In this report, the United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) begins the substantive portion of the report with background
information on optical scan systems and direct recording electronic systems
(DREs) and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The report then
summarizes security concerns and next moves on to reviewing recommended practices to resolve those concerns. Appendix II of the report
provides more detail on specific publications that issue guidelines on voting
system security and appendix III summarizes general guidance on
information systems security. The report goes on to identify U.S. Election
Assistance Commission (EAC), National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), and Technical Guidelines Development Committee
(TGDC), and nongovernmental initiatives to improve security. The GAO
concludes the report with recommendations for the EAC to define tasks,
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procedures, and time frames for voting system standards, voting system
certification, the National Software Reference Library for voting system
software, sharing information on voting system problems, and creating and
distributing recommended practices.
VOTERSUNITE.ORG, VOTETRUSTUSA & VOTER ACTION, E-VOTING
FAILURES IN THE 2006 MID-TERM ELECTIONS: A SAMPLING OF PROBLEMS
ACROSS THE NATION (Jan. 2007), http://www.votersunite.org/info/E-

Votingln2006Mid-Term.pdf.
This report examines problems associated with direct recording
electronic devices (DREs) and optical scanning voting systems used in the
2006 mid-term election. The three organizations collected the data from
surveys, reports from voters, and reports from the media. The reports were
sorted into the following categories: (1) total reports, (2) poll opening
delays caused by machine problems, (3) machine problems at poll closings,
(4) vote flipping and lost votes, (5) Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) problems, (6) machine malfunctions, (7) scanning problems, (8)
usability problems, (9) inaccessibility, (10) long lines and voters leaving
without voting attributable to machine problems, and (11) machine result
retrieval malfunctions. Within each category, there was a breakdown by
machine: (1) DREs, (2) scanners, and (3) electronic Ballot Markers (EBM).
The report finds that problems with DREs were much more common than
problems with the other voting systems. The authors admit the source
material is not complete or a representative sampling, but nonetheless draw
the conclusion that the reports indicate widespread problems with electronic
voting and cast doubts on election results.
TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, ISSUE BRIEF:
UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE OVER ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES
(May 2004),
http://www.tcf.org/publications/electionreform/votingmachine.pdf.
This issue brief from the Century Foundation provides an overview of
the digital recording electronic (DRE) machines used by many polling
places. Ms. Wang also covers the Help AmericaVote Act (HAVA) and
summarizes some of the requirements that need to be implemented by
January 1, 2006. Among these requirements are: (1) the notification of
overvotes and the ability to correct a ballot before final casting, (2) making
balloting available in alternative languages, and (3) some form of permanent paper record for audit purposes. The author identifies advantages of
DREs, including being fully accessible by disabled voters, fewer spoiled
ballots and the ability to have ballots available in an unlimited number of
different languages. She also points out the security issues, including
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source code problems; the inability of those counting the votes to independently verify that what the computer has recorded is what the voters
intended; and electronic vote transmission problems. Ms. Wang discusses
methods of limiting problems with the electronic system; one being a voter
verified paper trail (VVPT). She presents the arguments of those for and
against such a requirement and provides a section on using open source
code for the systems.
Stephanie Weaver, Machines of Democracy: How Voting Technology
Threatens the Integrity of Elections in the United States (Dec. 2005)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas Women's University) (on file with Texas
Women's University Library).
In this thesis, the author finds that computerized voting machines
threaten our democracy. She begins with an overview of voting technology
systems, past and present, focusing on direct recording electronic systems
(DREs). She then examines issues of security and accuracy surrounding the
use of DREs, looking at the lack of ability to audit them, hardware and
software problems, susceptibility to large scale manipulation, and DRE
problems in the 2004 election. She also identifies the problems associated
with private companies becoming more and more involved in the electoral
process as the complexity of voting machines increases. Finally she looks
at reforms and alternatives to DREs such as hybrid DREs that produce
paper ballots, voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPATs), precinct-count
optical scanning machines, open source code, improved federal election
standards, and public ownership of elections. She concludes reforms are
needed because our democracy demands accountability and reliability in
our elections.
PERIODICALS

R. Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler, The Likely Consequences of
Internet Voting for Political Representation, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1115
(2001).
This article discusses Internet voting and whether it will lead to better representation of the U.S. population. The authors show how technologies have consistently been embraced in the political arena. The latest
among these is the use of the Internet in political campaigns and its
introduction as a potential voting mechanism. Most of the article focuses
on survey and statistical materials used to show the effect of Internet voting
on political representation. Additionally, the authors speak to Internet
voting's potential violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Because
Internet voting is not prevalent, the authors derived information from a
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comparison of those who currently vote with those who would vote if
Internet voting were an option. They discuss the digital divide and how this
would affect many people's ability to take advantage of Internet voting.
They also state that Internet voting would benefit those who already have
Internet access at home and that this group tends to be white and have
higher incomes. The authors also discuss whether voter registration
reforms in the past have improved the representation of various groups in
the population. They look at the Motor Voter and Vote-by-Mail reforms
and determine that neither led to a significant increase in voter registration.
Analogizing those results, looking at the digital divide among potential
voters, and examining a study of the 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary, the
authors do not see Internet voting as increasing representation for those
"behind the digital divide." The authors see Internet voting resulting in
"minorities, the unemployed and the elderly losing further political power."
They conclude that an increase in voter participation can be a negative if
that increase is in an "already over-represented group."
R. Michael Alvarez, Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart I, Studying
Elections: Data Quality and Pitfalls in Measuring the Effects of Voting
Technologies, 33 POL'Y STUD. J. 15 (2005).
This article was written in response to Geralyn M. Miller's article,
Methodology, Statistics, and Voting Error: An Exploration of 2000
PresidentialElection Data in Two States, 33 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2005). The
authors take issue with Miller's data collection and research design,
questioning the results leading to her finding that punch-card technology in
at least two states did not produce more residual votes than other voting
technology. The authors assert that errors and omissions in state reported
data impedes research into voting technology performance and that there
were omissions and errors in the data Miller collected. They also assert that
single cross-sectional studies of individual states are statistically too small.
Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart IIl, Residual Votes Attributable to
Technology, 67 J. OF POL. 365 (2005).
This article looks at the relationship between changing voting
technologies and residual votes over time. The authors examine election
data over the 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections for president, U.S.
Senate, and governor. They find paper ballots, whether optically scanned
or hand counted, generally have the lowest number of residual votes. In
presidential races, punch-card systems performed the worst, while in senate
and gubernatorial races, mechanical lever machines performed the worst
followed by punch-card systems. The authors perform a panel analysis
rather than cross-sectional study of residual votes and find substantial
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differences in results. The authors assert that our current election system is
inequitable and that voting equipment and election administration substantially impact the number of residual votes.
Rebekah K. Browder, Internet Voting with Initiatives and Referendums:
Stumbling Towards Direct Democracy,29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 485 (2005).
In her article, the author discusses the benefits proponents of Internet
voting put forth, as well as concerns of the opposition. She addresses the
history of voting in the United States and the founders establishing the
United States as a "republic rather than a democracy." On this point she
elaborates the negatives in the potential combination of Internet voting and
initiatives and referendums. The author discusses how such a combination
may lead to direct democracy with voters potentially replacing the
legislative process. Additionally, she presents that lobbying efforts would
increase and lead to interference with voting and that the amount of
information brought to the voter from all directions would be too overwhelming. The author provides suggestions for the use of Internet voting,
while restricting ways to enact ballot measures and "to protect our
representative democracy." These protections include, among others, once
a year voting and increasing the required number of votes necessary to pass
initiatives and referendums.
Justin Buchler, Matthew Jarvis, & John E. McNulty, Punch Card Technology and the Racial Gap in Residual Votes, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 517
(2004).
The authors of this article review county-level data on voting systems
used in 2000 and the residual vote rates in the 2000 presidential election.
They find counties using Votomatic-style punch-card voting machines had
higher residual vote rates for all races, but had particularly high rates for
minorities. The authors argue that minorities face a double threat for
residual votes because they tend to be less educated, which leads to higher
residual votes, and they tend to live in counties using punch-card systems,
which also leads to higher residual vote rates. The authors assert that when
counties change voting systems there is a dramatic decrease in the residual
vote rate. They review Supreme Court precedent on voting rights and
analogize cases on redistricting and literacy tests to the disparate ballot
invalidation caused by punch-card voting technology. They conclude that
the higher residual rates caused by punch-card voting systems violate the
one person, one vote principle.
Marshall Camp, Note, Bush v. Gore: Mandate for Electoral Reform, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 409 (2002).
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The author of this note asserts that the Bush v. Gore decision departed
from equal protection precedence and that the Bush v. Gore holding
suggests differences in voting technology within a state may violate equal
protection law. The author begins by examining equal protection precedent
in relation to voting and finds that prior to Bush, equal protection claims
needed to be discriminatory toward certain groups or classes, discriminatory intent was needed, and that no constitutional violation exists if the state
has sufficient justification for the unequal treatment. The author argues that
under Bush, the need for unequal treatment of a group or classification of
people is eliminated; no discriminatory intent is required; and absent
compelling justifications, unequal treatment will not survive an elevated
standard of review. Thus, the author concludes that using different voting
systems with different residual vote rates intrastate violates equal protection
principles under Bush v. Gore. The author then rebuts potential counterarguments that states might make in response to suits on voting systems,
arguing there is no distinction between the Florida policy on recount
standards and a state policy permitting local voting machine purchases,
disparate treatment is enough to violate equal protection, rational justifications such as cost and the need to experiment will not satisfy the elevated
scrutiny required by Bush, and that election reform in progress will not
make such cases immediately moot.
Michael A. Carrier, Vote Counting, Technology, and Unintended Consequences,'79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 645 (2005).
The author begins this article with an analysis of the risks associated
with the five types of voting equipment: (1) paper ballots, (2) lever
machines, (3) punch cards, (4) optical scanners, and (5) direct recording
electronic devices (DREs). After concluding that DREs pose the greatest
danger for fraud and error, he discusses evidence of error and fraud from
the 2004 election and recommends improvements such as: (1) cryptography, (2) paper trails, (3) audits of vote counts, (4) publicly documented vote
counts, (5) increased security measures, (6) transparent and higher
certification standards, and (7) open source software.
Doug Chapin, The Machinery of Democracy: Voting Technology in
November 2004, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 553 (2005).
In this article, the director of electionline.org, a non-partisan clearinghouse of election reform information, looks at the 2004 election. He begins
by noting that while there were problems, they were relatively minor. He
then looks at some of the reported problems from around the country, some
of the mixed responses to the problems, and the administrative versus
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technical issues that arose. He concludes that the administration of
elections will join technological concerns as a significant issue in election
reform.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Fairnessat the Ballot Box, TRIAL, Apr. 2004, at 32.
In this short article Mr. Chemerinsky summarizes the five most common voting systems in use: (1) paper ballots, (2) punch-card machines, (3)
optical scanning systems, (4) DREs (touch screen), and (5) lever machines.
He identifies punch-card machines as the worst of the group. He provides
an overview of legal challenges to these machines. He also overviews
Voting Rights Act challenges in areas where different machines are used
within the same state, resulting in disparate treatment of voters' ballots. He
states that there is evidence to conclude that punch-card machines
"discriminate against minority voters."
Herbert Cihak & Jason Springman, HAVA and Arkansas Election Law
Reform: Compliance and Promise, 2006 ARK. L. NOTES 1.
The author, in this article, provides an overview of Arkansas' work
toward compliance with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in time for
the 2006 elections. Mr. Cihak provides descriptions of various studies that
were done on voting in the United States after the problematic 2000
national election: (1) Caltech/MIT, (2) U.C. Berkley, (3) National Task
Force on Election Reform, and (4) National Commission on Election
Reform. The author gives an overview of HAVA and then gives a detailed
summary of Arkansas responses to various HAVA requirements. He then
identifies issues that arose with respect to Arkansas' attempt to be in
compliance with HAVA by the 2006 primary. The Arkansas vendor for
equipment was Election Systems & Software. Mr. Cihak identified the
various problems encountered by the counties implementing electronic
equipment and their dealings with the vendor. He identifies what he
considers the biggest issue for Arkansas, as "administrability," which is
defined as " 'having a voting system in place that will actually work as
intended, given the limited funds and human resources available to the local
jurisdictions that must implement the technology.' "
Lillie Coney, E-Voting: A Tale of Lost Votes, 23 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 509 (2005).
In Carteret County North Carolina, over half the votes cast in the 2004
election, 4,438, were not counted due to the mistaken belief that an
electronic voting machine could store more ballots than it actually could.
This error resulted in a disputed election that was not resolved until much
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legal wrangling and time had passed. The author uses this example to
illustrate the problems arising from the inadequate implementation of the
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and paperless voting technology. She
recommends the development of tough, national e-voting standards, better
election administration, simplified ballots, greater accountability, and better
safeguards for voter privacy.
Elizabeth Garrett, Political Intermediariesand the Internet "Revolution,"
34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1055 (2001).
The author identifies two groups of people with respect to the Internet
and a democratic society. The first, she indicates, follow the "mobilization
theory," which embodies the idea that the Internet will lead to voters
participating more frequently in the governance process. The second group
she calls "reinforcement theorists." This group sees new technology as
affecting the political process, but not drastically changing the face of
politics in the near term. Ms. Garrett discusses the use of the Internet in
campaigns and its similarity to traditional campaigning activities. The
author addresses the ideas of Dick Morris (see annotation below) regarding
the ways he indicates that the Internet will "revolutionize democracy." She
argues that relying on the Internet may make more information available,
but it may not always be credible or balanced information. She also does
not agree with Mr. Morris' idea that use of the Internet will lead to direct
democracy. She asserts that most voters will not take part in online
referendums and will not want to spend the time necessary to make direct
democracy decisions necessary to run a nation. The author does believe
that the Internet will have some affect on political systems and she does
acknowledge its potential to have some affect on voter turn-out.
Paul S. Herrnson, Improving Election Technology and Administration:
Toward a Larger Federal Role in Elections?, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
147 (2002).
The author of this article examines options for election reform after the
2000 election, looking at both technological and administrative issues. He
looks at the advantages and disadvantages to optical scanning and direct
recording electronic machines (DREs), noting cost, security, and paper
trails. He also discusses Internet voting, concluding that while convenience
is an advantage, it suffers from more security and reliability issues than
DREs. He examines the idea of imposing uniform standards in technology,
procedures, and ballot design but finds that they would not take into
account diverse resources and would lock down local preferences, goals,
and experimentation. He suggests the federal government encourage
voluntary standards, fund studies, and become a resource for voting
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technology and election administration. Finally, he concludes that the
federal government should also provide financial assistance to improve
elections.
Michael C. Herron & Jonathan Wand, Assessing PartisanBias in Voting
Technology: The Case of the 2004 New Hampshire Recount,
- ELECTORAL STuD. - (forthcoming),
availableat http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.02.004.
Shortly after the 2004 presidential election, a study of New Hampshire
vote returns alleged that precincts using a particular brand of optical
scanning voting machines returned vote totals for John Kerry that were too
low compared to other voting systems. This article reviews the election
data and concludes that there was no evidence that the type of voting
machine used influenced the presidential or gubernatorial elections. The
authors argue that when engaging in a statistical analysis of vote returns and
technology, one must not assume that voting technologies are randomly
assigned to precincts and that underlying precinct political tendencies must
be taken into account. In their own analysis, the authors used variables
taking into account the political predisposition of precincts. The authors
assert that their methods can be used in the future to investigate allegations
of vote fraud.
Jason W. Hilliard, Case Note, Punch Card Ballots v. Direct Record
Electronic Voting: Why Ohio's Use of Different Methods to Count Ballots
Violates the Equal Protection Clause Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d
791 (N.D. Ohio 2004), 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 527 (2006).
After briefly reviewing the history of voting technology and prior
cases such as Bush v. Gore, this case note examines the Ohio case of
Stewart v. Blackwell, where voters alleged that the use of punch card ballots
in some counties and the use of direct recording electronic devices (DREs)
in other counties violated the Equal Protection Clause. The author argues
that the Stewart court incorrectly applied the rational basis test instead of
the strict scrutiny test and mistakenly concluded that using punch-card
machines is not arbitrary and unreasonable.
Joshua S. Hodas, Hack the Vote: The (In)security of Electronic Voting
Systems, 2004 UCLA J. L. & TECH. NOTES 14.
In this brief article, the author questions whether the rush to implement
new voting systems after the 2000 election implemented systems which are
insecure and which may lead to voter disenfranchisement. He discusses the
discovery of Diebold code and passwords by researchers at Johns Hopkins.
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He also discusses GEMS software and flaws regarding the storage of
information. The author also briefly describes the voter verified paper trail
and its use in alleviating some of the problems created by the use of these
new systems.
Steven Holtkamp, Case Note, Expedience v. The Public Interest: Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV.
371 (2004).
This case note examines Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, where plaintiffs requested an injunction to postpone the
California recall election until all punch-card ballots were phased out,
arguing that the punch-card voting system disenfranchised a greater number
of minority voters. The author analyzes the decisions of the Central District
Court of California, which denied the injunction; the three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit, which granted the injunction; and the Ninth Circuit sitting
en banc, which affirmed the district court. The author looks at prior Ninth
Circuit decisions and concludes that the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc
incorrectly affirmed the district court.
Clifford A. Jones, Out of Guatemala?: Election Law Reform in Florida
and the Legacy of Bush v. Gore in the 2004 Presidential Election, 5
ELECTION L.J. 121 (2006).
After the 2000 presidential election, Florida passed sweeping election
reform legislation. This article examines those reforms and the results in
2002 and 2004 elections. One reform passed by Florida was to eliminate
punch-card machines, lever machines, and old-fashioned paper ballots, and
replace them with touch screen direct recording electronic devices (DREs)
and optical scanning devices. Although there were problems with the new
voting machines, most of those problems were related to human error, and
not software or hardware problems. Also, the use of the new machines cut
residual vote rates in both 2002 and 2004. The use of DREs without voterverified paper trails did, however, result in some legal challenges. The
author examines one of these challenges, Wexler v. LePore. The author
concludes that although not all of Florida's election problems have been
resolved by the election reform, the improvements are substantial.
Jerry Kang, E-Racing E-Lections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1155 (2001).
Professor Kang's article looks at the pros and cons on electronic voting. He indicates that "e-voting is inevitable" and the focus with regard to
it should be on how to make it work better. He acknowledges that the
digital divide is a current issue, but states that a long-term view needs to be
taken rather than focusing on current problems. In taking the long-term
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view he indicates the digital divide will be much smaller within the next
decade. Additionally, in looking at long-term issues he discusses why
people, specifically minorities, do not vote. To address the long-term issues
he indicates that we cannot let the Internet develop and hope these issues
will be addressed, but must "intentionally design cyberspace's architecture." Mr. Kang discusses how the Internet can lead to people who
historically do not interact coming together in a virtual environment and
overcoming barriers that might be present in in-person interaction. He
discusses the ease of creating e-ballots in numerous languages, an act that is
too costly to be achieved in print. He emphasizes that short-term obstacles
should not shroud the use of the Internet in the voting process and that
attention needs to be paid to the proper development of inclusive systems.
He also addresses the direct democracy issue and indicates this may be a
detriment to racial minorities because of the correlation to also being in the
numerical minority. He advocates for the study of ways in which to
overcome the disadvantages of being a numerical minority. One of the
mechanisms he suggests is a means by which voters can be provided
assistance in using the new voting medium in the same manner information
is currently sent to voters in print to assist in "getting the vote out."
Eddan Katz & Rebecca Bolin, Electronic Voting Machines and the
Standards-SettingProcess, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2004, at 3.
This article calls for the development of new federal voting standards
to address voter verification, testing, and independent review. At the time
this article was written, no new voting standards had been promulgated
since 2002. The authors begin with a history of federal voting standards.
The authors then look at the issue of voter verified paper audit trails
(VVPATs), reviewing the controversy over DRE machines and the
responses by critics, who see VVPATs as the solution, and those who see
VVPATs as a flawed solution. The authors suggest that voting standards
should define the purpose of auditing DRE systems and examine the role of
the voter in the verification of his or her vote. Concerning testing, the
authors see the current multi-level certification process as unwieldy,
burdensome, and too costly. They suggest that new standards should
streamline and clarify the process. Finally, the authors examine the need
for an independent review of voting software. They find that independent
review is needed, the current exemption of commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) software is troublesome, and that while open source might be the
solution, open source needs to include the licensing as well as the disclosure of code.
Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579 (2003).
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The author summarizes the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and
briefly addresses some of the objections its critics raise. He finds the Act to
be a balanced, bipartisan law that will improve the voting process.
Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?,
35 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 541 (2002).
Although there is a public perception that the problem-plagued punchcard voting systems were more likely to be used by poor people and
minorities, the authors of this study find that this was not the case. They
find that, overall, there was little difference between African-Americans
living in counties that used punch-card systems and whites living in
counties that used punch-card systems, although Latinos were more likely
to live in counties that used punch-card systems. The poor were only
slightly more likely to live in counties using punch-card systems, but also
more likely to live in counties that used DREs. Democrats were more
likely to live in counties using lever-machines. In addition to looking at the
data on a national level, the authors compared differences across counties
within states.
Kristen E. Larson, Comment, Cast Your Ballot.com: Fulfill Your Civic
Duty Over the Internet, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1797 (2001).
This article explores the barriers and benefits of establishing Internet
voting systems.
Barriers that need to be removed include: (1) equal
access, (2) security, and (3) costs. Potential solutions include: (1) setting
up Internet voting at polls in multiple locations, (2) using advanced
encryption techniques, (3) moving the votes to secure computers, and (4)
the ultimate savings offsetting the short term costs. The benefits listed are:
(1) convenience, (2) fewer polling places, and (3) higher voter turnout. The
author looks at the Alaska straw poll and the Arizona Democratic primary
as test cases and discusses the California and Washington online voting task
forces. Finally, she examines Minnesota law and how it could be changed
to allow Internet voting.
Doris Estelle Long, Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another
Blastfrom the Digital Piratesor a Final Wake Up Callfor Reform?, 23 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 533 (2005).
In response to leaked memoranda and emails regarding bugs and
security problems in Diebold's voting software and equipment being posted
on Web sites, Diebold sent takedown notices invoking the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to the offending Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and Webmasters. Although subsequent litigation resulted in an
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agreement not to send any more takedown notices to ISPs and a declaration
that Diebold knowingly misrepresented that a copyright infringement
existed, the author of this article asserts that the DMCA still poses a threat
to free speech related to electronic voting machines and security issues.
The author examines the potential use of DMCA procedures to prevent
private testing of electronic voting machines and argues that reforms are
needed.
Colette Luchetta-Stendel, Comment, The E-Vote: A Proposal for an
Interactive FederalGovernment, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
1101 (1999).
The author of this comment proposes adding the ability for the public
to electronically veto legislation passed by Congress. She also proposes
allowing electronic submission of citizen drafted initiatives, Internet voting
for federal elections, and a formal process of electronic debate on proposed
legislation. She argues that using the Internet in this manner will reintroduce the principles of direct democracy. Based on an examination of
decisions in California and Oregon, she concludes her proposals would not
violate the Guarantee Clause or Separation of Powers principle in the
Constitution. She acknowledges issues regarding security and access with
such a system, but asserts that encryption technology and access to the
Internet through public libraries and schools would resolve these problems.
Andrew Massey, Note, "But We Have to Protect our Source!": How
Electronic Voting Companies' Proprietary Code Ruins Elections, 27
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 233 (2004).
The production of a voter verified paper trail (VVPT) has been hailed
as a resolution to concerns about security weaknesses in direct recording
electronic voting machines (DREs). The author of this note argues that
VVPTs are also flawed and recommends open source code as a solution
instead. He finds that a proprietary code based DRE fails to provide for
transparency or accountability. A VVPT does not resolve this problem
because of the need for voter anonymity and secrecy. Open source code
would be auditable and more robustly tested. Open source code would also
increase public confidence. He asserts that current escrow provisions,
preventing access to proprietary source code in order to protect intellectual
property rights, should be eliminated.
Walter R. Mebane Jr., The Wrong Man Is President! Overvotes in the 2000
PresidentialElection in Florida,2 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 525 (2004).
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The author of this article examines ballot level data on overvotes from
the Florida 2000 election and the type of voting technology used. He finds
that in counties using punch-card machines and central-count optical
scanning equipment, Gore lost more votes than Bush to overvotes.
Overvotes were least likely to occur in precinct-count optical scanning
machines where voters were given overvote warnings and a chance to
correct. Ballot design as well as technology impacted the number of
overvotes. He asserts that had the post 2000 Florida election reforms been
in place during the 2000 election, Gore would have won by approximately
30,000 votes. The author notes that the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
requires voting systems to allow voters to verify and correct ballots, but
permits states to warn in general ways not specific and immediate feedback
on overvotes in the individual's ballot. He ends the article calling for the
collection of ballot-level data to help with reform efforts.
Rebecca Mercuri, A Better Ballot Box?: New Electronic Voting Systems
Pose Risks as Well as Solutions, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2002, at 46,
available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/6/22256/01038569.pdf?tp=&arnumber= 1038
569&isnumber=-22256.
The author discusses the implementation of various electronic voting
systems after the 2000 presidential elections. She identifies the risks
involved with whole reliance on these new electronic systems and discusses
the flaws of Internet voting. She quotes a cryptographer regarding the
necessarily high bar in the security of Internet voting. She views Internet
security difficulties as "insurmountable" and sees problems with potential
tampering of Internet voting schemes. She proposes a system she refers to
as the Mercuri Method for electronic voting. Her method would involve a
voter verified paper trail that is maintained in the event of a necessary
recount or to be used for the official count. She provides an overview of
the problems states have encountered in switching to electronic voting
systems and cautions against placing too much "trust" in these systems.
Brian Mercurio, Democracy in Decline: Can Internet Voting Save the
ElectoralProcess?, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 409 (2004).
When discussing Internet voting, this article focuses on online voting
as opposed to offline electronic voting. Mr. Mecurio presents an overview
of current voting systems and their positives and negatives. He also
discusses in detail the idea of Internet voting and identifies the benefits and
pitfalls of such an electronic system. In his article he discusses the view of
opponents and proponents of Internet voting and shows how the arguments
on both sides are valid. Additionally, he shows how the current voting
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systems in use in the United States are fraught with similar problems feared
with Internet voting and then shows how some of the current voting
systems pitfalls would be alleviated by Internet voting. He discusses the
use of Internet voting in both remote and polling place situations. He
covers the use of Internet voting to increase voter participation, and the
perceived problem of Internet voting increasing participation only among a
select group. Mr. Mecurio addresses the digital divide arguments and
discusses minority voting in the current voting systems and if the Internet
were used. Additionally, he addresses "disadvantaged" voters. The author
also covers the reliability and accuracy of the current voting systems as well
as the reliability and accuracy of Internet voting. His discussion of the
accuracy and reliability issues shows that the Internet can improve these
areas. He advocates for Internet voting to begin in the polling place and to
later be expanded to remote voting. He also suggests significant trials be
done before widespread implementation and a phase-in of Internet voting.
This, he indicates, will allow voters to adjust to the new system and develop
faith in its accuracy and reliability.
Geralyn M. Miller, Methodology, Statistics, and Voting Error: An
Exploration of 2000 Presidential Election Data in Two States, 33 POL'Y
STUD. J. 1 (2005).
The author of this article argues that previous studies on voting
equipment and residual votes rely too much on county-level data when
analyzing counties from multiple states. Due to this misplaced reliance,
and a failure to look at precinct-level data in states using all five types of
voting systems; these previous studies may have missed intrastate factors
impacting residual rates. While previous studies have found punch-card
systems to have substantially higher rejected ballots than other voting
technologies, and thus implicate equal protection issues; the author's study,
using data from Pennsylvania and Wyoming, found no evidence that using
punch-card systems produced more rejected ballots than other systems. She
found other factors such as race and median income to be the cause of
residual votes. She concludes by calling for further studies.
Geralyn M. Miller, The Benefits of Scholarly Discourse: A Response to
"Studying Elections: Data Quality and Pitfalls in Measuring of Effects of
Voting Technologies Across States," 33 POL'Y STUD. J. 25 (2005).
This article was written in response to the article, R. Michael Alvarez
& Charles Stewart III, Studying Elections: Data Quality and Pitfalls in
Measuring the Effects of Voting Technologies, 33 POL'Y STUD. J. 15
(2005). Miller defends her research and her conclusions regarding punchcard voting systems having little impact on residual votes in intrastate
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studies of Pennsylvania and Wyoming. She reiterates her assertion that
intrastate factors may have more of an impact on residual votes than type of
voting technology used and that interstate studies may miss the significance
of those factors.
Eben Moglen & Pamela S. Karlan, The Soul of a New PoliticalMachine:
The Online, the Color Line and Electronic Democracy, 34 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1089 (2001).
While many people examining Internet voting in public elections focus
on the digital divide, the authors of this article argue the focus instead
should be on how experience with the Internet may affect political
organization. They note that with the Internet, location is increasingly
trivial and shared interests, not geography, determine communities. They
describe two alternatives to geographically based districting and how these
could be used to resolve the problems with geographic race-based
districting. The authors then look at the Internet and a direct democracy
system and see a major problem with such a system oppressing minorities.
They conclude that while the Internet can have a positive impact on our
political system, such as making alternatives to geographic representation
more acceptable, it may have a negative impact when it comes to governing.
Dick Morris, Direct Democracy and the Internet, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1033 (2001).
Mr. Morris is the president of Vote.com, an online polling website. In
his article Mr. Morris advocates that the Internet will lead to direct
democracy within the United States. He asserts that the use of the Internet
will reduce the cost of campaigns and that online voting will cause the
legislature to take more notice of the wishes of their constituents. He
provides a brief history of the make-up of the U.S. governing system and
why initially direct democracy was not feasible. He then shows how he
sees the Internet making such a system now possible. In addition to
indicating that the cost of elections will decrease, Mr. Morris states, in
reference to communications and advertising voting issues, that with the
use of e-mail "the mathematics dramatically change." He states e-mail will
be a no-cost alternative to direct mailings currently used. A caveat
mentioned is the inability to procure a comprehensive e-mail address list.
Another benefit Mr. Morris sees in the use of the Internet in the election
arena is the diminished "involuntary communication." He refers to
television and other advertising that the voter is involuntarily exposed to
and that had the viewer known it was to come he or she could take that time
to pursue a different activity. With the Internet he indicates this is possible
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since it requires an affirmative act by the voter to enter a web site or click
past a banner ad. Additionally, he indicates that the Internet creates betterinformed voters who are able to obtain information of different views on a
national issue by accessing news information from across the country via
the Internet. Mr. Morris also discusses that the use of referendums will
make it more difficult for legislators to ignore the wishes of the majority
and that the Internet will enable referendums to be more readily presented.
He states that the digital divide will disappear as the Internet becomes more
readily accessible with emerging technology and that this will lead to a
significant increase in voter participation.
Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush
v. Gore into a Vehicle for Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 357
(2002).
The author of this article examines the legacy of Bush v. Gore by

looking at four post-Bush v. Gore cases: Common Cause v. Jones, Andrews
v. Cox, Black v. McGuffage, and Coyner v. Harris. After briefly describing
the cases and their issues, he discusses whether the Bush v. Gore decision
can be extended to cases challenging voting machines. He looks at the
language of the case, the legal analysis of the case, and potential principled
limits on the case; and finds support for both limiting and expanding its
application. Assuming Bush v. Gore can apply to these new cases on
voting machines, he examines how it is applied in two of the cases. He
focuses on whether discriminatory intent as well as disparate impact must
be shown and whether rational basis or strict scrutiny should apply. He
concludes that voting machine challenges should not need to show
discriminatory intent and that strict scrutiny is the more appropriate
standard.
John T. Nockleby, Why Internet Voting?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1023
(2001).
The author of this article discusses the question of why Internet voting
would be appropriate. He plainly states he is ignoring the technological
difficulties associated with Internet voting. The author uses a paper by
Frank Michelman, which asked the normative question, "Why vote?" as the
basis for discussing "Why Internet voting?" The author discusses three
questions on the subject: (1) will Internet voting enhance equality?; (2) will
Internet voting result in better decisions?; and (3) how will Internet voting
enhance deliberative democracy?
Helen Norton, What Bush v. Gore Means for Elections in the
2 WYo. L. REV. 419 (2002).
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In this essay, the author examines how Bush v. Gore could be extended
beyond recounts. Part I identifies problems with the Florida 2000 election,
including high residual vote rates related to punch-card voting and the
disparity of residual votes between counties using one type of voting
equipment versus another. Part II discusses the Bush v. Gore decision and
finds that the Court's decision has departed from previous precedent by
raising disparities in the mechanics of counting ballots to an equal
protection violation. In Part 11, the author asserts that the Court's
reasoning can be extended to other flawed election practices such as the
patchwork of voting technology. Part IV of the article identifies legislative
reform as a parallel, or perhaps superior method, of curing flawed election
practices. She looks at the lack of legislative reform thus far in other states
and recommends that federal legislation may be needed to ensure, among
other things, that uniform voting technology be used statewide.
Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal
Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1171 (2001).
Mr. Pershing identifies his "day job" as that of a Voting Rights Act
litigator. Since that is his background, he begins his article by posing the
question, "Does Internet voting violate the Voting Rights Act?" In trying to
answer this question Mr. Pershing focuses on the denial of equal access to
the balloting process based on race. He provides an overview of the 2000
Arizona Democratic Primary and points out some of the enhancements to
the whole voting process, not just the availability of Internet voting, that
were made for that election. He also points out that the population that
received the most significant increase in voting ease was the "Internet
privileged." The author provides an extensive review of the denial and
dilution cases that have been brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. He discusses the line of dilution cases and asserts that the level of
proof needed in non-dilution cases is not clear. He discusses the 1982
amendment to the Voting Rights Act that removed the intent requirement
and the language of Senate Report 97-417 that was used in eliminating
intent and setting out factors to be considered. Additionally, he looks at the
allocation of voting resources and its result in leading to racially disparate
use of equipment fraught with errors in vote tabulation and recordation. He
provides all of this information as a pre-cursor into looking at how the
courts and legislators may react in Internet voting instances. Mr. Pershing
indicates that to implement Internet voting and ensure equality of access,
the Internet voting may need to take'place at designated locations rather
than allowing off-site voting. He also sees that at some later point, not
providing some form of Internet voting may lead to a section 2 denial of
access claim.
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Stephanie Philips, Comment, The Risks of Computerized Election Fraud:
When Will Congress Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV.
1123 (2006).
Since 1969, computer scientists have expressed concerns with security
flaws in electronic voting machines. The author of this comment summarizes decades of reports and studies documenting the remarkably consistent
problems and the recommendations to solve these problems with electronic
voting machines. She finds that despite these warnings, Congress has failed
to pass effective legislation to force states and voting machine manufacturers to address security issues in electronic voting machines. She also finds
that the courts have failed to protect voters and candidates from fraud in
electronic voting machines. While The Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) attempted to address problems with electronic voting, it did not
prevent problems with the 2004 election. The author argues that Congress
needs to increase the security of electronic voting by creating rigorous,
uniform standards for voting machine manufacturers that incorporate the
suggestions that computer scientists have made in the past.
Jessica L. Post, Note, Uniform Voting Machines Protect the Principle of
"One-Person,One-Vote," 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 551 (2005).
The author of this note begins by briefly examining the five types of
voting machines currently in use in the United States. She next looks at
election reform on the federal and state level. She goes on to discuss
judicial responses to voting machine error and asserts that in Bush v. Gore,
the Supreme Court mistakenly held that states could use different voting
machines with different residual voting rates. While acknowledging the
confusion surrounding the precedential value of Bush v. Gore, the author
looks at how the lower courts have begun to apply the equal protection
holding in Bush to the use of different intrastate voting technologies with
different error rates. She discusses the reasons for and against requiring
uniform voting technologies within states, and concludes that requiring
uniform voting technology is necessary to preserve the fundamental right to
vote.
Recent Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2023 (2004).
This article reviews the three-judge panel and en banc decisions by the
Ninth Circuit concerning a suit, Southwest Voter Registration Education
Project v. Shelley, to enjoin the California recall election. In the suit, the
plaintiffs asserted that punch-card voting systems disenfranchised a
disproportionate number of minorities because those systems have a higher
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residual vote rate. The district court denied the injunction. A three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on an expansive application of
Bush v. Gore. The article asserts that the three-judge panel went too far in
its application of Bush and would lead to any irregularity in an election
being vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The Ninth Circuit sitting en
banc reversed the three-judge panel but did not address the equal protection
claim, instead relying on a deferential standard of review. The article
asserts this decision treated the Bush decision as if it were irrelevant. The
article argues that the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc should have distinguished or narrowed the application of the Bush decision.
Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore in the States:
Dual Voting Systems and the FourteenthAmendment, 51 VILL. L. REv. 229
(2006).
In this article the authors assert that using multiple voting technologies
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. The article begins
with a history of election technology and follows with a look at empirical
research on residual votes and balloting equipment from the 2000 election.
Next, the authors look at the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and
find that it does not address problems inherent in using multiple voting
technologies. They examine Bush v. Gore and its implications, arguing that
the decision opened up the potential for equal protection and due process
scrutiny of voting administration. As evidence of this, the authors look at
post Bush v. Gore litigation in Illinois, California, and Ohio. They
conclude that conflicting applications of standards of review, the threat to
legitimate democratic process that disparate voting technologies represent,
and the lack of effective legislative remedies make this an issue the Court
needs to eventually address.
Richard K. Scher, Grasping at Straws, Rushing to Judgment: Election
Reforms in Florida, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 81 (2001).
The author looks at Florida's attempt at election reform post-2000 and
concludes that it was rushed and failed to truly reform the problems that
caused the 2000 election crisis. The author believes that adopting touch
screen voting machines or optical scanning devices will prove problematic.
He identifies concerns such as instructing voters to use the machines
correctly and the reliability, security, and accuracy of using such machines.
He asserts that technological reforms will not solve the problems that
Florida experienced in the 2000 election.
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Paul M. Schwartz, Vote.com and Internet Politics: A Comment on Dick
Morris's Version of Internet Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1071

(2001).
In this essay, Mr. Schwatz responds to Dick Morris' article Direct
Democracy and the Internet, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1033 (2001) (see
annotation above). The author discusses the three predictions: (1) less
expensive elections; (2) greater voter participation; and (3) development of
a "more direct form of democracy," made by Mr. Morris regarding the use
of the Internet in modem elections and responds to these predictions. The
author disagrees with Mr. Morris on most issues related to these topics. Mr.
Schwartz identifies ways in which the Internet will make elections more
expensive and discusses the continually increasing amount of funds spent
on television and other mass media communication advertising. The author
disputes the prediction of higher voter participation and indicates that any
increase will be among groups with already high overall participation rates.
The author sees the third prediction of direct democracy as problematic for
several reasons. First, those participating in online polling activities are
those already connected to the Internet; second, the inherent flaw in selfreporting data; and third, the skewing of information based on how a
question is posed or framed. Additionally, Mr. Schwartz sees privacy
concerns related to a move to Internet voting, that may cause people to
further remove themselves from the political process.
Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
625 (2002).
The author begins this article, a systems analysis of technologically
divergent election systems, by analyzing the ways that different voting
technology created a voting technology divide in the Florida 2000 election.
This divide disproportionately disenfranchised racial minorities and the
poor. He looks at how differing views on technology shaped the opinions
of the Florida Supreme Court in Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.
2000), as well as those of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000), and at how those views shaped the decisions. The author
examines the impact of "political lockups" on this voting technology divide
and finds it violates the Equal Protection clause and Voting Rights Act. He
asserts courts have a role in counteracting political lockups. The author
goes on to analyze federal and state legislative reforms and finds them for
the most part flawed. He concludes the article by suggesting seven
necessary tasks for election reform.
Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3
ELECTION L.J. 424 (2004).
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After a brief background look at the pre-2000 election system, Bush v.
Gore, and post-2000 studies on what went wrong, the author of this article
examines the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). He discusses the provisions of the act, the state plans filed regarding implementation of the act,
and issues that have arisen after the act. While the state plans vary, he finds
full implementation of HAVA has been delayed due to uncertainty over
federal funding, voting system standards, and the security controversy
regarding direct recording electronic devices (DREs).
Charles Stewart 1I, Residual Vote in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J.
158 (2006).
Residual vote rates fell between the 2000 and 2004 elections. This
article examines the collected data and concludes the reduction of residual
vote rates was substantially the result of improved voting technology. The
author finds that the greatest improvements came from upgrading punchcard and optical scanning equipment to direct recording electronic devices
(DREs). This finding contradicts previous studies in prior years that
concluded optical scanners produced the greatest gains. The author
attributes this to the newer DRE models and to improved training of poll
workers. Other factors that improved the residual vote rate included an
energized electorate.
Daniel P. Tokaji, The PaperlessChase: Electronic Voting and Democratic
Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1711 (2005).
In this article, the author begins by looking at the recent history
surrounding difficulties with the five different voting methods used in
elections and the federal and state responses., He identifies four equality
norms that should be used to examine voting technology: (1) racial
equality; (2) multilingual access; (3) disability access; and (4) interjurisdictional equality. After examining empirical research on electronic
voting and how that research relates to the four equality norms, he finds that
direct recording electronic devices (DREs) fare the best of the different
voting technologies in this examination. The author discusses the problems
of security and transparency regarding direct recording electronic devices
(DREs) and looks at whether verified voter paper trails resolve any of these
problems. He asserts that paper systems are no more accurate and reliable
than paperless systems, no more resistant to fraud and error, and may be
impractical.
He suggests alternatives to paper such as procedural
improvements, better standards and testing, cryptography, paperless audit
trails, and open source software. He also makes recommendations on how
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courts, legislative bodies, administrative bodies, and election officials can
build better voting systems.
Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment
Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 46 (2003).
Using a dataset of voter history records in South Carolina and Louisiana, and applying quadratic ecological regression methods, the authors
find that use of direct recording electronic devices (DREs) and lever
machines result in smaller ballot rejection rates for African-Amercians.
The authors summarize existing literature and studies on the issue of racial
disparity in rejected ballots and discuss the difference between their
research and these other studies. They find that DREs and lever technologies can potentially prevent overvoting and undervoting, whereas centralcount optically scanned ballots and punch-card machines do not. They also
determine that African-Americans intentionally undervote more than
whites. They conclude that voting technology can narrow but not completely eliminate the racial disparities in rejected ballots.
Eugene Volokh, How Might Cyberspace Change American Politics?, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1213 (2001).
The author discusses how voting on the Internet may be enhanced by
an interactive program that would assist voters in making decisions. He
envisions a system by which voters can obtain decision advice from
organizations, politicians and others with a web presence by visiting their
web sites. Once there, the voter can use the software to fill in his or her
ballot based on the sought advice. Additionally, Mr. Volokh sees a central
web location that would provide the information for various organizations
and a voter can select those with which he or she shares views. The author
indicates that such a system may be opposed by various groups, but
believes the arguments against it are surmountable. A benefit he identifies
from such a system is the ability of special interest groups to show
legislators just how many people in a demographic area voted based on that
groups recommendations. Such hard evidence may be more persuasive to
legislators when making key decisions. The author also presents a
discussion of how the use of cyber-space may result in a closer connection
to a voter's physical location.
Michael Odell Walker, Note, "Don't Show Them Where to Click and
Vote:" An Assessment of Electioneering Law in the United States as a
Consideration in Implementing Internet Voting Regimes, 91 KY. L.J. 715
(2002-2003).
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In this note the author provides a look at the use of, and the positives
and perils associated with, Internet voting. He begins by identifying three
types of Internet voting schemes: (1) poll site (traditional), (2) kiosk (public
places, e.g. malls), and (3) remote (from home). The author addresses early
Internet voting and describes the 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary's
online voting system that was a milestone in this area. He briefly discusses
what was involved with the primary and the subsequent challenge based on
a violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Additionally, the author
covers other federal and state activities related to Internet voting. He
describes the studies of elections conducted using Internet voting. The
author then provides a discussion of electioneering laws and how they may
be affected by Internet voting. He begins with a short history of why
electioneering laws were necessary and constitutional challenges to these
laws that were posed over time. He identifies the unique problems of
Internet voting on electioneering laws and provides a sample statute to
address these issues. Lastly, he discusses the potential constitutional
challenges that may be brought against these laws based on previous
Internet speech challenges by the ACLU.
Christina J. Weis, Note, Why the Help America Vote Act Fails to Help
Disabled Americans Vote, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 421 (20042005).
In this article, the author addresses the recently enacted Help America
Vote Act (HAVA) and the reasons it does not do enough to assist disabled
voters in the voting process. She begins by providing background on other
federal laws that have been passed in an effort to provide equal access to
disabled Americans. However, she identifies how these laws, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 fail to adequately achieve voting access for the
disabled. One shortcoming she identifies is the definition of "disability."
She also sees this shortcoming in HAVA. She identifies remedies available
under each of these laws, but does not see that they go far enough in
remedying the problem. Ms. Weis provides some historical background
and House and Senate actions preceding the passage of HAVA and how
accessibility issues for the disabled were addressed in the process and final
bill. The author also covers what states have done generally in response to
HAVA. She indicates HAVA compliance plans were vague as to how
accessibility would be achieved and that for the 2004 election access was
still limited. She indicates that while portions of HAVA have promise, she
does not see the Act as a whole as providing full voting ability to disabled
voters. Ms. Weis provides proposals for improving the law. Among these
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are mandating standards that will ensure accessibility and the provision of a
"meaningful definition of 'disability.' "
Jeanne S. Zaino & Jeffrey T. Zaino, The Changing Landscape of Election
Disputes, DisP. RES., Oct. 2004, at 11.
In this article the author looks at the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
and the changes made to voting equipment/systems since its enactment. He
provides several graphs to show the changes in the types of systems from
2000 to 2004. He discusses concerns brought about by the use of new
systems. Additionally, he provides an overview of the five major types of
voting systems: (1) punch-card; (2) mechanical lever; (3) paper ballots; (4)
optical scanning systems; and (5) direct recording electronic devices (DRE
touch screen) systems. Because of the desire, by some, for voter verified
paper trails (VVPT) the author addresses problems that arise when using
some of these systems when a VVPT is needed. Specifically, he indicates
that the use of the DRE is becoming more prevalent due to its accessibility
for people with disabilities. However, the DRE poses a problem because
there is no way to verify that a person's vote is properly recorded. The
author provides an overview of those in favor of and opposed to mandatory
VVPTs and the impossibility of a recount without such a system. He also
discusses the potential for fraud and other errors with DRE systems. The
author concludes that HAVA's attempt to "restore public confidence in the
nation's electoral process" may not be easily achieved and in some ways
thwarted by the increased use of high-tech voting machines.
STATUTES
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794d (2000 & Supp. 2003).
This act prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by programs
funded by, or in association with, federal agencies, and discrimination in
employment by the federal government or federal contractors. Section 508,
in particular, requires that technology obtained or used by the federal
government be accessible to those with disabilities.
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984
(VAEHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee-1 to -6 (2000).
This act requires accessible polling places for the elderly and disabled
for federal elections. If polling places cannot be made accessible, an
alternative method for casting a ballot must be made available. The act also
requires that voting aids be accessible.
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The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. §§. 15301 15545 (Supp. 2003).
HAVA was passed in response to the 2000 election. This act, among
other things, provides funding for states to update voting machines, creates
an Election Assistance Commission (EAC), and establishes minimum
standards for election systems.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 - 1973bb-1 (2000 &
Supp. 2003).
This act addresses discrimination in voting in regards to race,
language, or color. Section 2 in particular prohibits actions that have a
discriminatory impact, regardless of whether the actions are intentional.
The Uniform and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986
(UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1 to -6 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
This act establishes absentee registration and ballot access for service
people and those living abroad.
RELATED CASELAW

Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilitiesv. Smith (latercases v. Hood)
0

Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilitiesv. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d
1276 (M.D. Fla. 2002).

The plaintiffs in this case are a nonprofit organization, which is an
advocate for persons with disabilities, as well as several visually and
manually impaired voters in Duval County in Florida. Id. at 1278-79. In
this case plaintiffs brought suit claiming violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Article VI, sec. 1 of the
Florida Constitution. Id. at 1278. Plaintiffs allege these violations based on
defendants having certified voting systems that do not provide for
unassisted voting for the visually and manually impaired. Id. at 1279.
Multiple defendants at the state, county and city levels were involved. Id. at
1276. Claims against the Secretary of State and Director of the Division of
Elections were generally dismissed with prejudice (partially explained) and
one count, related to the Rehabilitation Act, was dismissed with leave to
amend. Id. at 1297. All counts against county and city officials were also
dismissed with prejudice (with some explanation/clarification given). Amer.
Ass'n of People with Disabilities,227 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
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* Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d
1345 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
A second case by the above organization and individual plaintiffs was
brought in the Middle District of Florida, federal district court. After
concluding that the dismissal in Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v.
Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2002) did not preclude this action,
the court held the following: plaintiffs have demonstrated genuine issues of
material fact based on regulations establishing facility requirements. Id. at
1353. Additionally, the claim alleging violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act with respect to not certifying a voting system to assist
manually impaired voters was allowed to proceed. Id. at 1355.
Several other orders came out of the district court with regard to this
litigation:
* Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d
1337 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
" Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d
1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
" Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, No. 3:01CV1275-J, 2004 WL 1041536 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2004).
* Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, No. 3:01CV1275JALLEYHTS, 2004 WL 1925009 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28,
2004).
* Amer. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, No. 3:01CV1275JALLEYHTS, 2004 WL 1925014 (M.D. Fla. June 4,
2004).
SW Voter RegistrationEduc. Project v. Shelley
*

SW Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 278 F. Supp. 2d
1131 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the use of punch-card machines in
the 2003 Gubernatorial recall election in California. Id. at 1131. Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the use of these machines, and thus delay the recall
election until proper replacements were made. Id. at 1134. The district
court determined that Plaintiffs did not meet the burden necessary to
warrant, nor did they show public interest required for, an injunction. Id. at
1146.
*

SW Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th
Cir. 2003).
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Plaintiffs in SW Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2003), appealed the decision of the district court.
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision. SW Voter
Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 912 (9th Cir. 2003).
The court discussed several issues in coming to its conclusion. Plaintiffs
were found to have adequately established that their federal constitutional
claims were likely to succeed on the merits. SW Voter Registration Educ.
Project, 344 F.3d at 894. The court deemed this a "classic voting rights
equal protection claim," id. at 895, and that the claim made by Plaintiffs
was virtually the same as the issue in Bush v. Gore, 532 U.S. 98 (2000). Id.
at 895. To succeed when seeking a preliminary injunction, the court
indicated that the plaintiff need not show he will prevail, but just the
likelihood that, when considered with the shown hardship, a preliminary
injunction will preserve the rights of the parties. Id. at 899. The court also
found that the district court erred in their res judicata analysis, id. at 901,
and on the laches claim. Id. at 905. Additionally, the court addressed the
claim related to two California Propositions that were added onto the recall
ballot and determined that the district court erred in denying the preliminary
injunction. SW Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 913. On
issuing its decision, the court stayed its order for seven days to allow for
further relief. Id. at 913.
*

SW Voter RegistrationEduc. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th
Cir. 2003).

The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc heard the case. The court reviewed
the district court's action in the light of whether there was an abuse of
discretion. SW Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918. With
respect to whether the district court abused its discretion in "weighing the
hardships and considering the public interest," the court found it did not.
Id. at 919. The court discussed the difficulty in changing the election now
that all the preparations had begun and the fact that absentee voters had
already cast ballots. Id. at 919. The court indicated that an action now
would halt an election in progress. Id. at 919. The court concluded that
the hardships suffered by plaintiffs would not outweigh the importance of
the need for the election to go forward as planned, and thus the court
affirmed the district court's judgment. Id. at 920.
Stewart v. Blackwell
*

Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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This case involved a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief from the use of central-count optical scan and punch-card voting
machines in several counties in Ohio. A Due Process violation under the
Equal Protection Clause and a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 were alleged. Id. at 795. The court found that the plaintiffs did not
provide sufficient evidence to make a case challenging the voting technologies involved. Id. at 805. The court concluded that there was no " 'actual'
denial of the right to vote" shown, and therefore the Voting Rights Act
claim was not established. Id. at 808. The court also concluded that
appropriate rational bases were given for the continued use of punch-card
and central-count optical scan machines. Id. at 808. Therefore, the court
concluded there had not been an Equal Protection violation and entered
judgment for the defendants. Id. at 808.
This case was subsequently appealed and reversed in part and vacated
in part by:
*

Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2005).

In this appeal the Sixth Circuit engaged in a discussion of standing, id.
at 853, and mootness, id. at 855. Additionally, the court provided
significant case law analysis related to the history of the right to vote. Id. at
856-58. Ultimately, the court determined that the defendants in the case
below had made a proper Equal Protection claim in their argument that the
use of different voting systems violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
865, 876-77. Therefore, the court reversed the district courts decision on
this issue and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment for
the plaintiffs. Id. at 880. With respect to the Voting Rights Act claim, the
court vacated the lower court's ruling and remanded the case with
instructions to the lower court to consider the "voluminous amount of the
plaintiffs' evidence. .. ." Id. at 878, 880.
The appellate court decision, Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F. 3d 843 (6th
Cir. 2005) was ultimately vacated by the vacation of the underlying district
court case, Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004) by
Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007).
Wexler v. Anderson (earlierdecisions v. LePore)
*

Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2006).

Elected officials from Florida, along with a registered voter,
brought suit against the Supervisors of Elections in Palm Beach and Indian
River counties and the Florida Secretary of State. The suit alleged equal
protection and due process violations. Id. at 1227. The court framed the
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issue as "whether Florida's manual recount procedures in those counties
employing paperless touch screen voting machines violate the rights of
voters in those counties to equal protection and due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Id. The
court describes the manual recount requirements in Florida and explains
how the recount is done in both jurisdictions using optical scan equipment
and those using paperless touch screen technology. Id. at 1228. Plaintiffs
argued that their equal protection and due process rights were violated
because paperless touch screen machines are incapable of providing the
information (paper trail) they believe Florida law intended. Id. at 1231.
Regarding this, the court looked at whether the different manual recount
methods employed resulted in arbitrary and disparate treatment of voters,
thus resulting in a deprivation of rights. Id. The court indicates that
Plaintiffs focus on the residual voter is not correct and instead a question of
whether touch screen voters are "less likely to cast an effective vote than
voters in optical scan counties?" Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d at 1231.
The court concludes that the burden borne by those in touch screen counties
does not warrant a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 1232. The court ultimately determines that the different manual recount employed with the
touch screen systems, as opposed to optical scan systems, is justifiable and
therefore does not amount to an equal protection violation. Id. at 1233.
Additionally, the court determined that due to the burden, if any, on the
voters from the differing recount mechanism, being justified there was no
due process violation. Id. at 1233.
Additional case law related to this suit can be found at:
"
"

*
"

Wexler v. LePore, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
Wexler v. LePore, 385 F.3d 1136 (11 th Cir. 2004) (vacating district
court (see below) that then resulted in the district court decision
above which was the basis of the 2006 appellate decision).
Wexler v. LePore, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
Wexler v. LaPore, 878 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (a
related state case affirming circuit court's dismissal)
Black v. McGuffage

*

Black v. McGuffage, 290 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. 111. 2002).

This case involved a civil rights action challenging the voting system
in Illinois. Id. at 891. Plaintiffs challenged the use of punch-card systems,
ineffective error notification in systems, and the inadequate education of
voters on some systems. Id. at 891. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the
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Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 891. Defendants sought to dismiss these actions.
In denying most of these requests, the court found the requirements of
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: 1) "the use of an electoral 'standard
practice or procedure' and 2) a resulting diminution of the opportunity to
African American and Latino voters 'to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice,' " were met. Id. at 897. The
court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated an equal protection
claim based on an analysis of Bush v. Gore and the determination that
"people in different counties have significantly different probabilities of
having their votes counted . . ." Id. at 899.
The court did grant the
defendants' motion to dismiss the claim based on a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause. Black, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 902. The
court, in stating the law allowing "significantly inaccurate systems of vote
counting to be imposed on some portions of the electorate and not others
with out any rational basis," found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged a violation of substantive due process. Id. at 901.

